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ABSTRACT 
FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION: VARIATIONS IN STATE FUNDING, 
IMPACTS OF STATE FUNDING ON DIFFERENTIAL TUITION, AND VARIABLES 
IMPACTING DIFFERENTIAL TUITION 
 
MICHAEL HOLBECK 
2017 
Public higher education in the United States has seen many changes since the 
Morrill Act of 1862. Specifically, the funding of higher education has changed greatly 
over the last half century, from very low tuition and relatively high state subsidies to an 
increased reliance on tuition to fund higher education.  While this funding change has 
been the national trend, the impact on specific states and universities has varied greatly. 
This study examines the funding variation between university peers, normalized using 
state general funds per resident student FTE, to analyze the variation of state funding 
between states as well as the differences in annual volatility.  In addition, this study 
assesses the use of differential tuition for a case study university in relation to changes in 
state funding. Finally, this study examines which variables impact the use of differential 
tuition on undergraduate programs. 
Survey data from eight institutions were analyzed to study the variations and 
annual changes in state support funding. Additionally, historical pricing and state funding 
data were used to analyze the impacts of state funding changes on the use of differential 
tuition. Finally, regression analysis was used to test if theories of cost-based pricing and 
consumer surplus could be used to explain the use of differential tuition at the case study 
university.   
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This study found that state support per resident state support student FTE vary 
greatly by university and that changes in funding can vary widely from year to year. 
Additionally, the analysis found a correlation between decreases in state funding and an 
increased use of differential pricing of undergraduate programs. Finally, the regression 
analysis indicated that theories of cost-based pricing and consumer surplus explained a 
significant portion of the implementation and variation in differential pricing at the case 
study university.
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INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of who should pay for public higher education has been an 
increasingly debated topic. As states’ budgets become increasingly tighter, the decision 
of funding public higher education becomes increasingly difficult. In addition, media and 
public views on the topic range from free college education for all (or at least those under 
a certain income level), to views that college education is a private good and should be 
paid for by those individuals who benefit directly from higher education (Georgetown 
University Center of Education 2016). Scholars join the discussion as they attempt to 
quantify the public versus private good of higher education (Baum, Ma, and Payea  2010; 
Bloom, Hartley, and Rosovsky 2007; Marginson 2007). While these views and analyses 
discuss higher education at a high theoretical and philosophical level, there is even more 
complexity as one dives into the funding of higher education. The truth of higher 
education financing is that states fund higher education very differently and because of 
the complexity and multiple missions of public universities, it is very difficult to get 
accurate comparisons between universities and across states. The equitable distribution of 
resources to the instructional units within a university adds yet another layer of 
complexity, as the cost of the services offered by these instructional units varies greatly 
between disciplines. Finally, as the debate regarding who should pay for higher education 
continues, state budget cuts force universities to take action on these theories and 
philosophies. The cost of educating students varies greatly by instructional unit, but the 
projected income of graduates of these various programs also varies greatly. The 
combination of all of these complex factors leads to several research questions: Who is 
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paying for higher education? Can we explain why are they paying for higher education? 
What differences exist in how higher education is funded? 
The debate on higher education funding gets caught between the principles of 
public higher education dating back to the Morrill Act’s establishment of land grant 
institutions and the financial realities faced by state policy makers. The Morrill Act of 
1862 established land grant institutions to provide educational opportunities for all 
citizens who wanted to take advantage of the opportunity. While this goal of access to 
higher education may not be lost on state policy makers, the reality is that keeping this 
access to higher education must be weighed against other funding needs such as health 
care, safety, and K-12 education (Hovey 1999; Kramer 2011; Tandberg 2010). These 
difficult funding decisions many times go against higher education because higher 
education can raise tuition to help offset its funding needs.  
As funding at the state level decreases for higher education, the debate on the 
topic in the media continues to increase. Media sources such as The New York Times, 
Boston Globe, and U.S. News & World Report have discussed ways and reasons that 
states and the federal government should increase funding for public higher education 
(Cohen 2003; Fieldhouse 2014; Horowitz 2015). Not all media sources are against the 
decreasing support of higher education; some suggest that states should stop subsidizing 
higher education (Skorup 2013). The principal debate for many of these articles focuses 
on the public versus private benefits of higher education. 
While some doubt the public benefit of higher education, suggesting that benefits 
such as higher taxes due to increased salaries of college graduates are more a case of 
correlation rather than causation, many researchers have tried to analyze and explain the 
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benefit to society (Baum et al. 2010; Bloom et al. 2007; Skorup 2013). The research and 
analysis on the private versus public benefits of higher education largely support the fact 
that both benefits exist; however, acknowledging that they exist has not ended the 
theoretical debate on who should pay. Additionally, a gap in the literature regarding who 
is currently paying keeps policy makers and researchers from having a common 
understanding of the present situation. Achieving a common understanding of who is 
currently paying is a very helpful step in providing a baseline for this debate. 
The difficulty in having a common understanding of who is currently paying is 
twofold. First, the state funding of that state’s resident students is not readily available 
data for each state. While the amount of state appropriations to a university can be 
obtained through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS) website, 
this state appropriation in many states includes much more than simply the amount of 
state funds for instruction of students. It includes such entities as Agricultural Experiment 
Stations, Cooperative Extension Services, and medical schools, for example. Therefore, 
without a way to accurately analyze the state funds provided specifically for these entities 
housed within the university, it is impossible to ascertain the true state general funds for 
instructional costs. Surveys that have tried to determine this number have experienced 
difficulty eliminating all of these entities and have been limited to a subset of large 
institutions (University of Colorado Boulder 2017). Additionally, resident student FTE 
are not available without the use of a survey tool. The combination of these factors result 
in a lack of a common understanding of the funding differences across states. 
The second difficulty in fully comprehending who is paying for higher education 
is understanding the differential tuition pricing policies between universities. As 
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discussed by Wolniak (Schmidt 2016), it is extremely difficult for higher education 
experts, much less students, to understand the price of a specific degree. Wolniak stated 
that three researchers (Schmidt 2016) attempted to determine the price of a specific 
program when differential tuition was evident and achieved three-way consensus only 
forty-four percent of the time. Therefore, even these experts could not agree on the stated 
price of a specific program with differential tuition more than fifty-six percent of the 
time. This difficulty is important because tuition bills for undergraduates can vary forty 
percent or more based on the academic program (Schmidt 2016). The challenge in 
understanding state support of resident students, as well as the tuition price students in 
varying majors pay, leads to a lack of common understanding of who is currently paying 
for higher education, and therefore impedes data-informed discussions on 
operationalizing who policy makers and researchers believe should be paying for higher 
education. 
Within universities there remain similar questions: What is an equitable funding 
of instructional units within a university? What programs, if any, should be charged 
differential tuition and how much? The internal allocation of resources within a 
university is a very important bridge between state funding and differential tuition 
pricing. Changes in state support funding may affect departments differently; as state 
support decreases, universities may choose to do across-the-board cuts or may choose to 
target their cuts. Additionally, as the use of differential tuition increases, the units that 
apply this differential to their programs may receive additional resources. Finally, the 
budget model of the university can affect all of these changes; whether the university has 
a rules-based model, such as a responsibility center management model, or a centralized 
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model, will impact how these resources are allocated. To fully understand impacts of 
state funding and impacts of differential tuition, universities must also examine the equity 
of their instructional resources allocations. Holbeck and Santos (2017) provide a 
methodology for estimating the equitable distribution of instructional resources between 
instructional units taking into account all resources, including differential tuition, and the 
impact of market forces and cost structures. While this analysis provides a methodology 
to analyze equitable distribution of resources, it does not address the rationale for 
charging those differential tuition rates to some instructional units, but not others. 
All of these complex variables have kept discussion of who should pay for higher 
education at a more philosophical than pragmatic level. We propose this situation is 
caused by a lack of common understanding of who is paying for higher education and 
why are they paying for it. The goal of this study is to contribute to this discussion by 
providing an accurate analysis of funding from state general funds per resident student 
FTE across university peers, as well as testing theories explaining the implementation of 
differential tuition. As university leaders and policy makers try to enact needed cuts to 
balance budgets or implement decisions about which programs to increase differential 
tuition on, research surrounding these topics will be needed to help inform such 
decisions. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this study is to examine funding from state general funds per 
resident student FTE across university peers, as well to test theories explaining the 
implementation of differential tuition to determine: 
1. the variation of state funding per resident student FTE across peer institutions 
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2. the differences in annual volatility of state funding among state support 
institutions 
3. if increased use of differential tuition is related to changes in state funding 
4. which variables impact the use of differential tuition 
Significance of Study 
 The reduction of state support for higher education is resulting in increasing 
pressure on higher education finance. There is concurrent pressure on higher education to 
remain affordable. Philosophical debates about who should pay for higher education 
based on public versus private benefits continue throughout the country, as do debates on 
equity and access to higher education as tuition prices continue to increase. As policy 
makers and researchers struggle with these questions, a common understanding of current 
funding levels by state and an understanding of current differential pricing structures and 
rationales will help inform the decisions on these important questions. Examining how 
states are currently funding higher education can inform the political discussions within a 
specific state, as well as provide researchers a common understanding of funding 
differences in order to more accurately assess the public good return of higher education. 
Understanding the rationale for current differential pricing structures can inform the 
discussion on the equity/inequity of charging differential tuition, as well as provide 
information to support the philosophical questions of who should be paying for higher 
education. For decisions to be made on higher education going forward, there needs to be 
a common understanding of the current structure, and this research will help advance that 
needed knowledge. 
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Definitions 
Cost of Instruction 
 Cost of instruction for each department was defined as the weighted average of 
the cost per CIP (Classification of Instructional Program) of departmental peers for the 
courses taught by that department using the Delaware Cost Study. 
Differential Tuition 
Differential tuition was defined as a published variation in rates based on a 
specific discipline, major, or field of study. This could be assessed specifically as 
different tuition rates or by using fees, charges, etc. Some variations are based on a 
specific course, due to costs specific to that course, and not applicable to all courses 
within the discipline, major, or field of study were not considered differential tuition 
(examples include field trip charges and lab fees associated with particular courses).  
Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident FTE 
 Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident FTE was defined as 
the result of dividing the Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University 
Overhead by the Net State Supported Resident Full-Time Equivalent Estimate. 
Mid-Career Salary 
 Mid-career salary was defined as the median salary for alumni with degrees in a 
specific major with 10 plus years of experience, as reported by PayScale.com (2017). 
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead 
 Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead was defined 
using the IPEDS definition for state appropriations less any state appropriations not 
directly related to Core Teaching or University Overhead. IPEDS defines state 
appropriations as the amounts received by the institution through acts of state legislative 
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bodies, excluding grants, contracts, and capital appropriations. Funds reported in this 
category are for meeting current operating expenses, not for specific projects or programs 
(U.S. Department of Education 2017). 
Net State Supported Resident Full-Time Equivalent Estimate  
 Net State Supported Resident Full-Time Equivalent Estimate was defined using 
the IPEDS definition of full-time equivalent students less non-resident and non-state 
supported students. IPEDS definition uses the full-time equivalent students plus the 
undergraduate part-time enrollment times 0.60 for public four-year institutions plus the 
part-time graduate enrollment times 0.36 for public 4-year institutions. 
Price Setters 
 Price setters are defined for the purposes of this paper as those involved in the 
price setting decisions at a university. This term is meant to encompass all individuals 
involved in the price-setting process, as well as to take into account that the process will 
vary significantly between universities and states. 
Starting Salary 
 Starting salary is defined as the median salary for alumni with degrees in a 
specific major with zero to five years of experience, as reported by PayScale.com. 
Organization of the Study 
 Chapter 1 of this study contains the introduction, statement of the problem, 
purpose statement, significance of the study, and definitions of terms. Chapter 2 contains 
the literature review and previous literature focusing on state support of public higher 
education, studies of state support per student FTE, studies of resource allocation within a 
university, history of differential tuition, and differential tuition implementation. Chapter 
3 describes the theory and methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 contains the results 
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and findings of this study. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the of the findings, 
limitations of the study, conclusions based on the data, and recommendations for practice 
and further study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This literature review will be comprised of five sections: State Support of Public 
Higher Education, Studies of State Support per Student FTE, Studies of Resource 
Allocation within a University, History of Differential Tuition, and Differential Tuition 
Implementation. 
Researchers and policymakers study funding and equity in higher education in 
many contexts, including student access, faculty and staff compensation, and public 
benefits versus private returns. As state support of higher education has decreased, an 
increased focus has been put on higher education funding. This focus includes an 
examination of historical state support of higher education as well as differences between 
states in funding of higher education. In recent history, an increased emphasis has been 
placed on resource allocation methodologies within universities as well as the equity, or 
perceived equity, of the resource allocation within universities (American Academy of 
Arts & Science 2016a, 2016b; Engell and Dangerfield 1998; Newfield 2009; Peseau and 
Orr 1980; Rosinger, et al. 2016; Slaughter 1993; Slaughter and Cantwell 2012; Strauss 
and Curry 2002; Whalen 1991). Finally, as tuition has increased, researchers and 
institutions have increasingly assessed the pricing structures in higher education. 
Differential tuition is one method now used to offset a loss in state support resources, in 
addition to covering increasing expenses. Since the students cover these increased costs 
instead of the state, some argue that differential tuition is a way to increase revenue 
without across-the-board tuition increases, as well as to make the purchasing of these 
differential products more equitable (Yanikoski and Wilson 1984). This literature review 
will discuss state support of higher education as a backdrop to the discussion of funding 
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differences per resident student FTE, analysis of resource allocations within universities, 
and the increased use of differential tuition. 
State Support of Public Higher Education 
The funding landscape of higher education has changed significantly over the last 
two decades, with public universities receiving decreasing levels of state support 
(American Academy of Arts & Science 2016a, 2016b; Feldman 2012; State Higher 
Education Executive Officers Association 2015; National Association of State Budget 
Officers 2014). Public and political pressure to keep costs low has also had an impact on 
higher education (Kim and Jo 2015). The philosophic question of what kind of good is 
higher education (e.g., a public good or a private good), along with impact of pricing on 
different demographics applies yet another layer of pressure on higher education finance 
(Allen and Wolniak 2015; Chingos 2016; Delisle and Dancy 2016; Georgetown 
University Center of Education 2016; Marginson 2007).  
Many theories address the decrease in state funding of higher education. These 
theories reside on a wide spectrum and with many different viewpoints. Some are 
primarily financial, suggesting that the reduction of state support is simply a function of 
the “balancing wheel” effect as states try to fund multiple needs including healthcare, 
safety, and education (Hovey 1999; Kramer 2011; Tandberg 2010). As state funds fail to 
grow at the pace of the needs placed against them, higher education feels the burden 
because it has the ability to generate revenue through tuition, which typically does not 
exist for the other needs of state government. 
On the other end of the spectrum from the simply financial “balancing wheel” 
theory, there exist those who theorize that anti-intellectualism in America is having an 
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impact on how society views higher education. They suggest this anti-intellectualism is 
affecting the funding and support higher education receives. This negative attitude 
towards education, scholarly activities, and practitioners can divide the general 
population’s view on state support of higher education. There are those who support the 
state’s funding of higher education and others who view the state’s investments in higher 
education as funding the upper class. The latter group may view state funding of higher 
education as a tax of the majority of society, who in their estimation do not benefit from 
higher education (Romero 2016).  
Other theories suggest that society views higher education as a transactional good. 
The dual credit program, where high school students can obtain high school credits as 
well as college credits while in high school, is at the center of this controversy. Some 
argue that this program benefits students by lowering their cost of obtaining 
postsecondary education because they start college with some credits already completed 
at a significantly reduced rate or, in some states, at no cost to the individual. Opponents 
suggest that dual credit exposes higher education to a possible lack of rigor, and focuses 
too much on seat time and standardized testing (Krueger 2006). In addition to the 
transactional nature of dual credit, there is also a financial component. In some states 
such as Utah, the state, school districts, and the postsecondary institutions share the cost 
of dual credit (Krueger 2006) so that students can obtain these credits at no cost. In other 
states, it is estimated this program saves millions of dollars for both the parents and the 
state because of the students’ decreased time to degree in college. Although this appears 
to be a win for the state and the students or their parents, it can be very costly for 
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universities that receive reduced tuition for these courses without state funding to offset 
the discounted tuition (Krueger 2006).  
The implementation of dual credit varies largely by state; some states provide the 
education completely free, while others charge discounted tuition. The funding is also 
variable; some states provide resources for the program, others share the burden between 
districts, institutions, and the state, while others rely solely on institutions to cover the 
financial burden. This variation in the state support of dual credit also exists in the overall 
funding variation between states. Political, economic, and structural variables have all 
been found to impact the funding of state higher education (Kramer 2011; McClendon, 
Hearn, and Mokher 2009; Weerts and Ronca 2006). These variables impact and result in 
variations in state support of higher education between states. Regardless of which theory 
one subscribes to, or which states one analyzes, it can be seen that state funding of higher 
education has been decreasing. This decrease in state funding results in increased 
pressure on higher education finance. 
In response to these pressures, higher education has had to look at both how much 
it is charging, whom it is charging, and how resources are allocated internally. This self-
reflection has resulted in many universities changing to a more decentralized, or 
responsibility centered budget model (American Academy of Arts and Science 2016a; 
Hearn, et al. 2006; Whalen 1991).  The change in price of tuition, allocation of those 
price increases, as well as allocation of the changing resource base within a university all 
pose questions about equity. 
The changing higher education landscape will continue to put pressure on 
university leadership, political leaders, and researchers to understand how higher 
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education is currently being funded, and will fuel the debate about current equity in state 
support, resource allocations within universities, and pricing of higher education, as well 
as equity going forward. As universities adapt to the new funding of higher education, it 
will be important to understand the existing differential pricing structures and the 
philosophy and equity behind differential tuition. In addition, as universities transition 
from centralized budget models to rules-based budget models, the questions of equitable 
distributions of instructional resources within the university will be of paramount 
importance (Hearn et al. 2006). This dissertation aims to help fill the gap, both by 
discussing the history and use of differential tuition, as well as by presenting a 
methodology of estimating the equitable distribution within an institution. Combining 
these two concepts will provide a baseline for understanding the interlocked policy 
decisions of pricing and resource distribution.  
Studies of State Support per Student FTE 
 While understanding the history of state support of higher education is important, 
it is equally vital to understand that state support of higher education is not uniform 
across all states or even for all public universities within a state. Comparing funding for 
higher education across states can be normalized in multiple ways, such as funding per 
capita, funding per student FTE, and funding per resident student FTE. Many analyses 
and studies have used these normalized data either to compare institutions or as variables 
in an analysis (Kramer 2011; State Higher Education Executive Officers Association 
2015; University of Colorado Boulder 2017; Weerts and Ronca 2006; Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education 2016). While funding per capita may originally seem 
like a valid way to get comparable state funding data, this measure ignores the fact that 
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demographics vary greatly by state. Therefore, a state with an older population or a state 
with a lower percentage of students going into higher education would be expected to 
have lower funding. In addition, in states that have fewer students in higher education, 
the funding per student is actually higher than the per capita number may suggest. 
Therefore, funding per student may be a preferred measure.  
 However, funding per student FTE may is not as straightforward as one may 
think. Two issues influence the definitions of state funding and student FTE. The first is 
the fact that FTE includes both resident students and non-resident students. Strict state 
funding per FTE does not account for the fact that many non-resident students pay a 
higher tuition. The theory behind non-resident students paying a higher tuition than 
resident students is that the state’s dollars are going to subsidize the cost of education for 
the students of that state, as opposed to the non-resident students who are paying closer to 
the true cost of instruction (Carbone and Jenson 1971; Nelson 2008; Mumper 2001; 
Southern Educational Board 1976). Therefore, a university with a high number non-
resident students will have additional resources from these students’ higher tuition and 
may be able to operate with less state general funds. Similarly, this example institution 
would be expected to be supported less by its state dollars because the state is interested 
in subsidizing its own students, not those from other states. Reciprocity agreements 
between states can lower the costs for non-resident students of specific states, but 
typically, these students still pay a higher price than resident students. 
The second issue with regard to state funding per student FTE is due to the term 
state funding itself. State supported universities are complex organizations and within 
these organizations exist non-instructional missions, such as Agricultural Experiment 
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Stations, Cooperative Extension Services, medical complexes, Economic Development 
Institutes, and Research Consortiums, for example. These non-instructional missions 
operated within the university typically also receive state dollars. Therefore, comparing 
the state dollars at a university with an Agricultural Experiment Station to a university 
without an Agricultural Experiment Station would result in the first university appearing 
to have additional state general funds per student FTE, all else equal, even though the 
Agricultural Experiment Station dollars are earmarked and cannot be used for funding 
student instruction.  
Popular secondary data that exists when it comes to state support per student FTE 
includes the IPEDS, State Higher Education Executive Officers Association’s State 
Higher Education Finance Survey, and a study by the University of Virginia. The IPEDS 
data include all state general funds going to a university (including Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Cooperative Extension, and other non-instructional units) and all 
student FTE (U.S. Department of Education 2017). The State Higher Education 
Executive Officers Association’s State Higher Education Finance Survey maintains the 
same FTE definition as the IPEDS survey, but changes the state support definition by 
excluding spending for research, as well as agricultural and medical education, to make 
the state support funding analysis more comparable across states (State Higher Education 
Officers Association 2015). Finally, the University of Virginia conducts a survey in an 
attempt to ascertain the instructional state support per resident student. This survey 
requests data from universities using the IPEDS enrollment FTE definition but limit it to 
resident students. The Virginia study also suggests that state appropriations exclude 
hospitals, extension services, and other non-instructional units. Unfortunately, some of 
17 
 
the data points in the survey results still include Agricultural Experiment Stations, 
Cooperative Extension, and medical schools (University of Colorado Boulder 2017). This 
study also consists mainly of large institutions with In-State FTE alone of greater than 
20,000 FTE. As a result of the lacking research on comparable state support per resident 
FTE data, we arrive at the following research questions: 
1. How does state funding per resident student FTE vary between peer 
institutions? 
2. Does state funding per resident student FTE follow similar patterns for each 
peer institution, or does year-to-year variation occur by institution? 
Studies of Resource Allocation within a University 
 Resource allocation models within universities have been a popular topic in many 
articles (Hearn et al. 2006; Whalen 1991). Whalen (1991) focused on the implementation 
of the responsibility centered management model at Indiana University. This work 
includes a very detailed analysis of making the transition to a rules-based allocation 
model. It also discusses the benefits associated with moving to such a model, which 
include aligning incentives for increased income and reduced costs, as well as aligning 
authority with responsibility. Hearn et al. (2006) provide a case study of the University of 
Minnesota as they transitioned to an incentives-based budget system, finding that going 
to this model brings to the forefront the difficult pursuit of access, quality, and efficiency. 
They also found that this approach made the university’s investment patterns and cross-
subsidies more transparent. While these articles discuss rules-based allocation and 
transparency going forward, they did not focus on the equity of past distributions.  
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As discussed in Holbeck and Santos (2017), the current literature that does focus 
on equity fails to take into account market forces and cost structures (Newfield 2009; 
Santos 2007; Volk et al. 2001) when analyzing resource allocation within a university. In 
their analysis, Holbeck and Santos found that market forces and cost structures do 
account for the variation in funding between instructional units at their case study 
university. They also found that, contrary to prior studies, the allocation of resources is 
equitable across discipline types; previous studies had found that certain discipline types 
were underfunded, such as the humanities. The allocation of instructional resources 
within an institution is an important link between state funding decreases and pricing. As 
state funding decreases and universities are required to make decisions on budget 
reductions and tuition increases, understanding the equity of their current allocation can 
help inform decisions on tuition increases, such as the use of differential tuition. 
Understanding which programs are truly high cost, when assessed against peers, can help 
inform which programs should possibly have differential tuition applied to them. 
History of Differential Tuition 
The principles of access to higher education in America date back to the Morrill 
Act, which established land grant institutions to provide educational opportunities for all 
citizens who wanted to take advantage of the opportunity. State supported higher 
education maintained this access principle by states providing the majority of resources to 
institutions, thus requiring a low financial contribution from individuals, through the 
1960s (Nelson 2008; Toutkoushian 2001; Ward and Douglass 2005).  
In recent years, however, contributions from states have not kept pace with the 
cost of instruction and state support has decreased as a percentage of the overall budget 
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(American Academy of Arts & Science 2016a, 2016b; Feldman 2012; State Higher 
Education Executive Officers Association 2015; National Association of State Budget 
Officers 2014; Ward and Douglass 2005). In addition to the decrease in higher education 
funding from the state, there has also been a shift in the view of the benefits of higher 
education. While higher education was traditionally seen as offering both public and 
private benefits, the prevailing view has shifted to seeing it as more predominantly a 
private benefit (Ward and Douglass 2005). As a result of these factors and an increase in 
the cost of higher education, tuition and fees rose at two to three times the rate of 
inflation in the 1980s, and 51 percent above inflation in the 1990s (Toutkoushian 2001). 
In addition to across-the-board tuition increases, universities looked for other ways to fill 
the gap between shrinking resources and rising expenses. One such method was tuition 
differentials. 
Prior to the 1970s, tuition differentials between programs were primarily found in 
professional programs, such as medicine and law. Other program differentials were found 
between resident and non-resident rates (Nelson 2008). In the 1970s, many institutions 
began to charge differential tuition between undergraduate and graduate courses; this 
change from having one flat rate was often in response to the recognition of higher costs 
(Saupe and Stephens 1974). In the 1980s, tuition differential increased and gained 
support as a mechanism for securing much-needed revenue with relatively low risks to 
enrollment (Yanikoski and Wilson 1984). Although the implementation of differential 
tuition may have been cost and revenue driven, the academic discussion on the topic is 
much more complicated than just dollars and cents. 
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The issue of equity with regard to the implementation of differential tuition has 
advocates on both sides of the discussion. There are those who have argued that uniform 
tuition is fair (Southern Regional Education Board 1976). Additionally, many institutions 
have rejected or continue to consider the impacts of differential pricing prior to 
implementing the practice (Gordon 2009; University of Washington Office of Planning 
and Budgeting 2011). Other institutions, such as University of Illinois and the University 
of Michigan have had price differentials between both high-cost majors and upper 
division coursework for some time (Yanikoski and Wilson 1984). While there remain 
those opposed to differential tuition, the number of universities having at least one 
undergraduate program with differential tuition or fees continues to increase from 45 
percent in a 2008 study to 57 percent in a 2011 study (Nelson 2008; Reed 2011). The 
implementation of these programs has been steadily increasing since the mid-1990s 
(Cornell Higher Education Research Institute 2012). There also appears to be a difference 
in the type of institutions implementing differential tuitions. Public doctoral degree 
granting institutions are more likely to have some form of differential tuition when 
compared to public master’s- and bachelor’s-level public institutions (Ehrenberg 2012). 
While many studies discuss the impact of price on enrollment in higher education, 
(Crous 2015; Hemelt and Marcotte 2009; Jackson and Wethersby 1975; Perna et al. 
2005) significantly fewer look at the impact of differential tuition price or its impact on 
students and discipline-specific enrollment (Nelson 2008; Strange 2015; Ward and 
Douglass 2005); there appears to be a lack of research that examines in which majors are 
cost and differential tuition closely tied, and in which majors they are not. Many of these 
studies focus simply on the majors that most frequently use differential tuition, such as 
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engineering, business, nursing, and professional schools, but ignore other majors that 
have differential tuition or are high cost (Strange 2015; Ward and Douglass 2005; 
Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education 2016). As seen in Nelson (2008), 
research has been conducted on differential tuition for residents versus nonresidents, and 
upper and lower divisions, but a lack of research remains on differential tuition by 
undergraduate program.  
Differential Tuition Implementation 
Although differential tuition by undergraduate program has been an understudied 
topic, other types of differential tuition have been studied and rationale provided. 
Differential tuition for resident versus non-resident students is one of the first forms of 
differential tuition, and is justified by the fact that states want to subsidize their residents’ 
undergraduate education and therefore charge a higher cost to non-residents who in 
theory should not be subsidized (Carbone and Jenson 1971; Nelson 2008; Mumper 2001; 
Southern Educational Board 1976). Although it is believed these higher rates for non-
residents reflect true costs, universities also adjust prices for non-residents based on 
reciprocity agreements and revenue and capacity concerns (Mixon and Hsing 1994; 
Rizzo and Ehrenberg 2004).  
Non-resident pricing, attendance, and politics can be complicated issues for 
universities. As discussed, higher pricing for non-residents can be thought of as 
universities charging these students full cost while discounting the resident rates based on 
the state subsidy. This, as it turns out, is not what happens in practice. States and/or 
schools many times enter reciprocity agreements with other states (Rizzo and Ehrenberg 
2004). In general, these agreements lower the price for residents of State A below the 
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stated non-resident price in State B. In return, students from State B can attend 
universities in State A at a price below the stated non-resident price. Some of these 
agreements are program specific, but often the agreements are more general. The goal of 
these agreements is to help drive efficiencies and lower the price of higher education for 
students of particular states.  
Reciprocity agreements can eliminate the need for participating states to maintain 
separate and possibly costly programs in some fields, such as veterinary science (West 
2015). By having reciprocity agreements between two states, students from state A who 
want to study a specific program that may not be offered in their state can go to the 
reciprocity state B that has that program at a rate lower than the posted non-resident rate. 
This allows both states to specialize in different programs, but allows lower priced access 
to a wider variety of programs for the citizens of both states. Many times, these 
reciprocity groups are geographical (National Association of Student Financial Aid 
Administrators 2017).  
These agreements can be politically sensitive, as they charge students from other 
states less than full price, in theory. They also can be considered to take spots in 
competitive programs away from resident students. On the other hand, reciprocity 
agreements can be considered good political and financial moves as they increase the 
options for their states’ citizens and can drive efficiencies and increase revenues if a 
university has excess capacity.  
In addition to non-resident tuition as a revenue policy lever, differential tuition by 
major can be used to adjust revenues. In current literature, it is suggested that differential 
tuition has been used as a revenue policy level to replace lost state general fund support. 
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Strange (2015) states that in the face of declining state support, many universities have 
introduced differential tuition. Nelson (2008), through interviews, also found that most 
institutions implement differential pricing in the face of declining state support and high 
costs.  
Current literature discusses high-cost majors that typically have differential 
tuition, such as engineering, business, and nursing (Strange 2015), but fails to discuss 
high-cost majors that may not have correspondingly high differential tuition, such as 
biology and education (Middaugh et al. 2003).  
As state funding of higher education continues to decrease, universities must 
change the way they operate. While the national trend has been decreased funding for 
higher education, the amount of state funding can vary by state. In addition, state 
economies vary widely and the size of the decrease may vary based on the current 
situation in that state’s economy. As universities adjust to the changes in funding, we 
have seen an increase in the use of rules-based allocation methodologies to align 
incentives and funding with responsibility. These changes result in a need to analyze the 
equity of these allocations as universities increase tuition to offset the state budget cuts. 
Once universities understand the equitable distribution of current resources, they can be 
better informed as they implement differential tuition on their programs. As a result of 
gaps in this literature, we have developed the following research questions: 
Research Questions 
1. How does state funding per resident student FTE vary between peer institutions? 
2. Does state funding per resident student FTE follow similar patterns for each peer 
institution, or does year-to-year variation occur by institution? 
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3. In the face of decreasing state support, are public universities pricing education 
more like a for-profit firm? 
4. Do the theories of cost-based pricing and marginal utility, specifically consumer 
surplus, explain the differential tuition pricing structures in higher education? 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter will describe the theoretical framework for the analysis of who is 
currently paying for higher education and why, as well as the methodology used to study 
this question in this study. The chapter will begin by discussing the theoretical framework 
for state funding per resident FTE. Next will be the conceptual framework for differential 
tuition and instructional costs. The type of studies done will be discussed and a 
description of the study provided. Finally, the methodology used in this study for state 
support per resident student FTE and differential pricing will be discussed. 
Theoretical Framework for State Funding per Resident FTE 
 State funding per Resident FTE is a tool used to estimate the funding of a state in 
their residents’ education. In our theory, the state provides a subsidy to its residents, 
allowing them to pay a lower tuition rate than non-residents, who in theory are not 
subsidized. Therefore, we theorize that a state’s support of its resident students is a valid 
measure of that state’s investment in higher education. 
 To obtain comparable state appropriations for our peer group of universities, we 
must remove all state funds not directly related to core teaching or university overhead. 
This would include Agricultural Experiment Stations, Cooperative Extension Services, 
Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic Labs, medical schools, and other programs not 
related to core teaching and overhead. Once these units’ state general funds are removed 
from the IPEDS reported state general funds, the remaining state general funds should be 
comparable for peer universities. 
 Secondly, the state supported resident student full-time equivalent must be 
calculated. To get comparable data, we must remove all non-state supported students, as 
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well as all non-resident students, from each university’s IPEDS full-time equivalent 
student data. In addition, if any specific units, such as medical schools, are removed from 
the state general fund appropriations, the corresponding student FTE must also be 
removed from the student FTE calculation. 
 As a result of completing these two steps, we theorize that we will have 
comparable state appropriations per state-supported resident student FTE. As mentioned, 
based on the theory that state support provided to institutions of higher education is to 
benefit the residents of that state, we believe that these data will be good indicators of 
both the level of state appropriations and of the year-over-year trends in state support of 
higher education by state.  
 While other options for comparing state support of higher education, such as 
funding per capita or funding per student FTE, are alternative methods for comparing 
states, we would suggest that these measures have larger limitations than our state 
funding per resident student FTE. Funding per capita fails to account for age 
demographic differences between states, as well as the varying levels of higher education 
demand between states. These limitations of funding per capita would cause states that 
have a much older age demographic (e.g., Arizona) to look as if they are under funding 
higher education because of the large population and relatively smaller demographic of 
typical college age students, resulting in smaller demand for higher education than other 
states. 
 Additionally, state funding per student FTE also has its limitations compared to 
our preferred measurement of state funding per resident state-support student FTE. The 
difference in these two measures is that our measure uses only resident state-support 
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student FTE as opposed to all student FTE. Using all student FTE includes non-resident 
students who pay a higher price than resident students do. In general, non-residents pay 
this higher tuition because they are not receiving the subsidy from the state in which they 
are attending school, as opposed to residents of that state who are receiving the subsidy. 
In theory, the non-residents are paying closer to the actual cost of education than the 
residents. So if a school has a significant portion of its students who are non-residents, it 
may not need as much state funding because it is charging all of these non-residents a 
price close to the actual cost of instruction. Therefore, comparing state funds per student 
of this university with a significant number of full-paying non-residents, with a school 
that has primarily residents who are subsidized by the state would result in the state with 
non-residents appearing to fund education at a lower level. In actuality, the additional 
tuition paid by the non-residents could result in the funding to be equal between the two 
schools.  
 While we believe our preferred methodology of using state funds per resident 
state-support student FTE is most accurate, it is not without its own limitations and 
assumptions. Using this method requires the assumption that states do not subsidize non-
residents. We know that this is not true because reciprocity agreements lower the out-of-
state price for students from certain states, which would suggest that states do subsidize 
non-residents. There are a variety of reasons that states would be willing to subsidize 
non-residents, such as: increased revenue at little or no marginal cost if capacity exists, a 
desire to increase the population as some non-residents may become residents after 
graduation, or a need for an increased educated workforce to drive economic 
development. While these limitations exist and should be analyzed further, that analysis 
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is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, we suggest that state funding per state 
support resident student FTE is the best available measure.  
Theoretical Framework for Price Differentials 
In state-supported higher education, in sharp contrast to a for-profit business, 
universities sell their product at a price below the cost of production (Winston 1999). 
Therefore, since universities are not-for-profit institutions, the higher the subsidy, the 
further the price of the product is below the cost of production. Public universities 
charged very little tuition through the 1960s, because the heavy subsidy from the state 
was sufficient to cover the cost of instruction and overhead (Nelson 2008; Toutkoushian 
2001; Ward and Douglass 2005). 
Although nonprofits do have a non-distribution constraint, which means that no 
one individual owns them and they cannot distribute profits as a for-profit firm does, 
there are no restrictions pertaining to cross subsidizing within a multiproduct non-profit 
organization (Hansmann 1981; Weisbrod 2009). One can see how unequal subsidies 
could have existed as higher education was heavily state funded. Even if one ignores 
market forces influencing faculty salaries, it would still be reasonable to assume that cost 
discrepancies existed; for example, education in chemistry requires the purchase of 
chemicals and lab supplies, while English does not. Even if this subsidy did exist and 
chemistry majors were receiving a higher subsidy due to the higher cost of their program, 
this discrepancy in subsidies may not have received much attention because the costs of 
higher education for both students were being covered almost completely.  
Following the 1960s, tuition began to be a larger factor in higher education 
financing. As state support decreased and costs increased, higher education began to 
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increase tuition. In the 1970s, tuition increases were primarily across all majors. While 
the cost discrepancies discussed still existed, the state was still funding the majority of 
the cost of public higher education so the fact that the chemistry student was getting a 
higher subsidy might still not have received much attention. 
In the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s, the cost of tuition increased substantially 
and contributions from state general funds decreased (American Academy of Arts and 
Science 2016a, 2016b; Feldman 2012; State Higher Education Executive Officers 
Association 2015; National Association of State Budget Officers 2014; Toutkoushian 
2001; Ward and Douglass 2005).  Universities continued to have to increase price, either 
across the board in tuition increases, or though differential tuition by major.  
The process for increasing tuition prices or adding differential tuition to 
undergraduate majors varied by state and institution. In our case study institution, the 
process for adding differential tuition is controlled at the highest level by a board of 
regents. Although the board of regents has final approval, the process of adding 
differential tuition involves many more people. The process at the case study institution 
for adding differential tuition typically comes from a department, which makes a request 
to a dean, who then vets the request with the Vice President for Academic Affairs and the 
finance office, who then makes a recommendation to the President. The President then 
has final jurisdiction at the university as to whether the request for differential tuition is 
forwarded on to the board of regents. Finally, the board of regents makes the final 
approval or denial of the program fee request. This is the process of our case study 
institution, which will undoubtedly be different at other institution who may or may not 
have a board of regents and who may follow a significantly different process. Some 
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universities may require approval from legislative bodies, while others may have a more 
decentralized pricing process and the president of the university may have the final 
authority. 
As a result of the varying structures of tuition and specifically differential tuition 
approval, we have chosen to use the term “price setters” to encompass all individuals 
who play a role in pricing tuition, and specifically differential tuition, at a university. 
Similarly, we chose this generic term so that it can be applicable to all of the varied 
processes that may exist in tuition price setting at universities. 
As state funding continues to decrease price setters at public universities must 
weigh their mission of providing access to higher education with the financial reality of 
balancing their budgets. The choices made by these individuals impact the price of 
education, which in turn impacts access to higher education. Raising tuition may decrease 
the ability for lower socio-economic families to send their students to college, especially 
with stagnating need-based student aid and slumping incomes for less advantaged 
families (Dougherty and Kienzl 2006). 
 A conflict theory perspective on education may suggest that education serves to 
reproduce inequality and would suggest that raising the price of education is an additional 
way to keep current social stratification in place (Bowles and Gintis 2007; Collins 1971). 
Other views on education through a conflict theory perspective suggest that the chance of 
success differs greatly between economic classes. These differences can be caused by 
variations in economic stability, home ownership, and social capital both for the student 
in the classroom and the parents trying to navigate the complex educational system 
(Bourdieu 1985; Colman 1988; Conley 2001, Sadovnik 2007). These disadvantages in 
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addition to typical economic differences add to the pressure for price setters to keep 
tuition low and not add yet another barrier to access.  
We suggest an alternative to the conflict perspective; we suggest that price setters 
instead use a rational choice perspective while weighing their options. Rational choice 
can be viewed as theory that informs individuals about how to best achieve their 
objectives. It involves a calculated approach where individuals weigh potential outcomes 
and probabilities and justify their actions based on a means-ends calculus (Blackwell 
2000; Ostrum 1991). In our analysis we assume price setters will use a rational choice 
approach as they make price setting decisions. They will use this approach in evaluating 
the students’ views of the need and benefits of education. In addition, they will use this 
approach to evaluate student’s willingness to pay based on each degree’s financial impact 
on their estimated starting salary.  
As the price setters at universities have weighed their options, many chose to use 
differential tuition (Nelson 2008). To analyze why this occurred, we propose the use of 
two economic theories within the constraint of the nonprofit organization definition. The 
first theory is cost-based pricing in which a firm prices its product to ensure that it is 
profitable, or at least that it can cover its cost (Courcoubetis and Weber 2003). While we 
suggest that state supported universities use this theory, we must remember it within the 
constraint of the non-profit definition. Recall that non-profits cannot distribute profits, 
but they can cross subsidize within a multiproduct organization such as a university 
(Hansmann 1981; Weisbrod 2009). As universities continue to become more reliant on 
tuition and less reliant on state subsidies, we suggest that they will operate more like a 
for-profit firm than they have in the past, and that cost-based pricing theory will 
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increasingly inform university pricing. It is important to note that as states decrease the 
funding of state supported higher education, universities will still behave and operate as 
non-profits. We are suggesting here that their pricing strategies will increasingly use the 
theories of for-profit firms, but we are not suggesting that state support universities will 
become for-profit. 
The second theory that we propose is the economic theory of marginal utility, 
specifically looking at consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is an economic measure of 
the difference between what a consumer would pay for a good or service versus what was 
actually paid. It is important to note that consumer surplus is not based on a consumer’s 
ability to pay, but is instead based on what they would be willing to pay.  
There are many difficulties in trying to analyze an individual’s consumer surplus, 
especially in their educational choices. Each individual will be willing to pay a different 
amount for their education, based a variety of variables. These variables could include the 
prestige or internal value of getting a degree, the individual’s enjoyment of education, the 
student and/or their parent’s financial situation, the price of obtaining that degree, and the 
financial benefit of getting a degree, to name a few.  
Willingness-to-pay variables are not easily measurable for university price setters. 
For example, the university is not able to estimate how much two students’ individual 
willingness to pay varies based on their internal value of getting a degree. For one 
student, the internal value of being a college graduate may be extremely important and 
therefore this student would be willing to pay a large amount for a degree just because of 
the internal value in addition to the financial gains that come with being a degree holder. 
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The other student may not get any internal value from having a degree and is only 
interested in the financial gains that come with being a degree holder.  
In this example, assume the cost of a degree is Y.  Then assume the first student is 
willing to pay $50,000 just for the internal value of being a degree holder plus the 
financial gain of being a degree holder of $X, and the other student is willing to pay $0 
for the internal value in addition to the financial gain of being a degree holder of the same 
$X. The resulting consumer surplus for the first student ($50,000 + $X - $Y = student 
#1’s consumer surplus) would be higher than the second student ($0 + $X - $Y = student 
#2’s consumer surplus). Of course, the price setters at the university have no way of 
knowing that the first student’s willingness to pay and resulting consumer surplus is 
$50,000 more than the second student and even if they did they would not be able to set 
two separate “sticker prices” for the two consumers. They may be able to adjust the net 
price through discounting and scholarships, but that discussion is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
Since university price setters are limited to one “sticker price” per program, they 
must use the information that they have available to set a price that allows the institution 
financial stability, without reducing the consumer surplus for the student too much, or to 
a negative amount. Reducing the consumer surplus too low or to a negative amount 
would result in a decrease in enrollment.  
The university in its price-setting model can only easily estimate two of the 
suggested variables that impact a student’s consumer surplus for all students, namely, the 
price of obtaining that degree and the financial benefit of the student getting that degree. 
The other variables, such as internal value, are not easily obtainable and vary greatly by 
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student. Even more, the university is able to control only one of these, which is the price 
of the degree. Therefore, as institutions price education going forward, they will want to 
be careful not to increase the price on specific majors above a student’s willingness to 
pay, or else one would expect to see a drop in enrollment in that major. Therefore, we 
propose that universities will increase the differential tuition on the majors that they 
perceive to have the highest consumer surplus using the information they have. Noting 
that universities really have information only on their price and the economic return on 
investment for the student, we propose that they will see majors with the highest starting 
salary as the majors with the highest consumer surplus, all else equal, and will therefore 
price those majors higher than a major of similar cost with a lower starting salary.  
Using the theories shown here, we developed the following research questions; 
3. In the face of decreasing state support, are public universities pricing education 
more like a for-profit firm? 
4. Do the theories of cost-based pricing and marginal utility, specifically consumer 
surplus, explain the differential tuition pricing structures in higher education? 
In order to test these research questions, we propose two hypotheses using cost-
based pricing theory. The first hypothesis (H1) is that as state support decreases the 
implementation of pricing differentials will increase. The second hypothesis has two 
parts; (H2a) the first part is that one of the variables that drives differential tuition is the 
cost of instruction.  
 In addition to cost of instruction, in the second hypothesis we introduce variable 
#2, expected starting salary, based on consumer surplus theory. As the university decides 
how to raise tuition, it will consider both cost of instruction (variable #1) and expected 
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starting salary (variable #2). Price setters will try to ensure that all majors have a positive 
consumer surplus for prospective students, while trying not to negatively affect 
enrollment (or at least minimize the negative impact on enrollment). Therefore, we add to 
the second hypothesis (H2a) that expected starting salary would also play a role in 
determining the price of a specific major. Combining these two variables, we arrive at 
Equation 1.  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
In Equation 1, we estimate, for each discipline, a price that takes the general form 
specified in Equation 1, where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a 
discipline 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represents the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represents the expected starting 
salary of discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit 
hour. In this case, 𝛽𝛽1 measures the change in price per student credit hour given a one-
unit change in the cost of instruction.  Similarly, 𝛽𝛽2 measures the change in price per 
student credit hour given a one-unit change in the expected starting salary. 
We maintain that cost-based pricing and consumer surplus are the best theories 
we can use to explain differential tuition in higher education. Because of the limited 
literature on the subject, nothing suggests that other variables affect differential tuition 
pricing. In our findings section, we will analyze our error terms to see if they are 
patterned in such a way as to suggest the existence of a third variable that we have 
mistakenly omitted. This two-variable model may seem overly simplistic amidst the 
complexity of higher education funding, controversial distribution of benefits (public 
versus private good), complex political arenas and organizational hierarchies (taxpayers, 
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legislatures, governing boards, and state governments), not to mention the science (or art) 
of pricing for businesses in general. We suggest that all of the complexity of higher 
education may actually lead to a simplified thought process for price setters, so they are 
able to navigate all of the stakeholders and are able to easily articulate the rationale for a 
program-specific differential tuition.  
In addition to running Equation 1, for the starting salary of a discipline, Equation 
2 will be run where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a discipline 
𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represents the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represents the expected mid-career salary of 
discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit hour. In 
this case, 𝛽𝛽1 measures the change in price per student credit hour given a one-unit change 
in the cost of instruction.  Similarly, 𝛽𝛽2 measures the change in price per student credit 
hour given a one-unit change in the expected mid-career salary. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Comparing the results from the regression in Equation 1 to the results of Equation 2 may 
provide some information regarding whether universities are using starting salaries or 
mid-career salaries to estimate the consumer surplus of students. Our hypothesis is that as 
students are looking at universities and estimating their repayment of student loans they 
are going to look at the starting salary, which in turn will cause universities to use starting 
salaries as opposed to mid-career salaries in their analysis of consumer surplus, even 
though mid-career salaries are probably a better proxy of lifetime earnings. 
 This theoretical framework for price differentials assumes that all of the programs 
analyzed are privy to a portion (as decided by the university) of the state general funds 
subsidy. If some of the programs are privy to a portion of the state general funds but other 
37 
 
programs are not, then this theoretical framework would not be applicable. Looking at an 
extreme example, assume a university has only four programs and two are privy to state 
general funds and the other two programs are required to be self-supporting without state 
general funds. We would expect the state-supported programs to behave more closely to 
the pricing structures of the 1960s, where even though cost differentials in programs 
existed, the substantial state funding allowed very low tuition rates to be charged to all 
programs and therefore differential tuition was not used because of the subsidy. Counter 
that with the way we would expect the two self-supporting programs to behave. We 
would expect these self-supporting programs to rely heavily on differential tuition to 
adjust the cross-subsidy (if any) between the two programs based on cost of instruction 
and consumer surplus. 
 As shown in this example, state subsidized programs would be expected to 
operate and price very differently than unsubsidized not-for-profit programs. As a result, 
programs of these two types should not be comingled in the proposed regression analysis, 
as the non-state subsidized programs would be expected to be outliers because of the 
differential pricing required for their sustainability. 
Conceptual Framework for Instructional Cost 
 As seen in Equations 1 and 2, instructional costs are expected to be an 
explanatory variable for the differential tuition charged for various programs. Holbeck 
and Santos (2017) provide an approach for analyzing the cost of instruction in higher 
education, which includes all resources and uses institutional peers and the Delaware 
Costs Study Database to estimate the cost of instruction. They used this methodology to 
analyze equity within our case study institution. We will use this methodology both for 
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generating a cost of instruction estimate for our regression analysis, as well as to discuss 
the equity among colleges at the university studied. 
For this analysis, we define the instructional costs for a unit as the expenditures of 
peer universities with similar programs. Conceptually, Holbeck and Santos (2017) 
defined costs as the financial resources an academic unit would surrender in order to 
provide its instructional services if the prices and quantities of its various inputs were 
identical to those of its peers (which, by definition, provide substantively similar 
instructional services using a similar instructional design). This methodology of 
estimating cost will serve this study well, as it will help to align costs specific to a 
program in our case study with the instruction services and instructional design with that 
of its peers, which, all else equal, will help control for quality and instructional design of 
a specific program. In order to discuss these costs, we will review the assumptions about 
the variables that influences these costs used in Holbeck and Santos (2017). 
Assumptions on Instructional Cost Drivers 
On a very basic level, we model the academic unit as a producer of instructional 
services, which it delivers through coursework and other learning activities, using the 
National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) definition 
for instruction expenses.  
Instructional expenses are activities that are part of the University’s instructional 
program to communicate educational content and include general academic, 
vocational/technical, special session, community education, and preparatory/remedial 
activity. All expenses associated with these instructional activities, including personal 
services (salary and benefits of individuals involved) and all operating expenses 
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associated with these activities (such as travel, contractual services, supplies, and 
equipment) are accounted for as instructional costs. 
The instructional services of a college are its outputs; whereas, the personnel 
services and operational goods and services a college uses to provide its outputs are its 
inputs.  A college’s vision, mission, and strategic goals inform the design of instructional 
programs with which a college transforms inputs into outputs.  We refer to this 
transformational process as a college’s instructional design.  In general, inputs and 
instructional-design characteristics drive instructional costs per student credit hour.  
Examples of input characteristics could include the composition of instructional 
faculty ranks and the extent of faculty qualifications, both of which are suggested to drive 
the prices of inputs. 
Faculty ranks:  Holding all else constant, the prices of inputs rise—and, 
thus, a college’s instructional costs per student credit hour rise—as the 
share of faculty members who hold senior, tenured ranks rises.  This 
change is because, on balance, a seasoned, tenured faculty member—one 
who holds the rank of full professor, for example—earns a higher salary 
than does an early career, tenure-track faculty member or a non-tenure-
track, adjunct faculty member. 
Faculty qualifications:  Holding all else constant, the prices of inputs 
rise—and, thus, a college’s instructional costs per student credit hour 
rise—as the demand in the academic labor market for a faculty member’s 
qualifications rise.  This is because, on balance, a faculty member with 
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qualifications that are in relatively high demand earns a relatively high 
salary. 
 While these are a few suggested input characteristics, many more input 
characteristics that exist but are unknown to the authors could drive price. Additionally, 
these input variables may not be true in all settings; as salary compression and salary 
inversion exist at various levels across various universities, there could be completely 
different variables that drive input prices. Therefore, instead of attempting to identify all 
of the variables or analyzing the validity of the examples shown here, the authors opt for 
a peer-based model as will be discussed later. 
Instructional-design characteristic examples include instructional-faculty 
workload, the share of instructional expenses not attributable to instructional-faculty 
services, the highest degree offered in a discipline, and the institution’s Carnegie Basic 
Classification.  
Faculty workload:  Holding all else constant, a college’s instructional 
costs per student credit hour rise as its faculty members’ instructional 
workloads fall.  This change is because the quantity of instructional 
faculty members must rise in order for the college to supply a given 
quantity of instructional services. 
Highest degree offered in the discipline:  Holding all else constant, a 
college’s instructional costs per student credit hour rise as the highest 
degree it offers in a discipline rises.  This change is because, relative to 
undergraduate instruction, graduate instruction typically requires small 
class sizes and more hours spent advising, mentoring, and researching. 
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Carnegie Basic Classification:  Holding all else constant, a college’s 
instructional costs per student credit hour rise as the number of programs 
in which its institution offers the terminal degree rises, as the level of 
research activity at its institution rises, and as the representation of 
science, technology, law, and business in its institution’s curriculum rises.  
The Carnegie Basic Classification reflects these instructional-design 
characteristics. 
Conceptual Model for the Instructional Equity Analysis 
Using the assumptions and methodology described here we estimate, for each 
discipline within each academic unit, a conditional mean: the average instructional costs 
per student credit hour based on the peer universities selected by each department. This 
average instructional cost is used in Holbeck and Santos (2017) as well as for the 
instructional cost variable in regression Equations 1 and 2. The equation we are 
estimating to get the instructional costs per student credit hour is specified in Equation 3. 
In this equation, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the instructional costs per student credit hour in a discipline 
for institution 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 through 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 represent 𝑛𝑛 institution-𝑖𝑖, discipline-specific input and 
instructional-design characteristics, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of 
instructional costs per student credit hour. 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (3) 
For example, suppose 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represents the share of instructional faculty members in 
the discipline who hold the rank of full professor—an input characteristic—and 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the doctoral degree is the highest degree offered in the 
discipline and 0 otherwise—an instructional-design characteristic.  In this case, 𝛽𝛽1 
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measures the change in instructional costs per student credit hour given a one-unit change 
in the share of instructional faculty members who hold the rank of full professor.  
Similarly, 𝛽𝛽2 measures the change in instructional costs per student credit hour given that 
a doctoral degree (as opposed to, say, a master’s degree) is the highest degree offered in 
the discipline. 
We can think about the right-hand side of Equation 3 as the conditional mean of 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖—that is, the average instructional costs per student credit hour in a discipline at 
institution 𝑖𝑖, conditioned on institution-𝑖𝑖’s discipline-specific characteristics that drive 
these costs—plus the random component, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖.  As such, we write Equation 3 as Equation 
4, where, 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖�, represents the conditional mean of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
 y𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (4) 
To appreciate more intuitively the conditional mean in this analysis, suppose 
𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  | 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖� takes the form specified in Equation 5, where 𝛽𝛽0 = $200, 𝛽𝛽1 =$0.10, and 𝛽𝛽2 = $50. 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖� = $200���
𝛽𝛽0
+ $0.10���
𝛽𝛽1
𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + $50�
𝛽𝛽2
𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 (5) 
In this example, the characteristics that drive institution-𝑖𝑖’s instructional costs per 
student credit hour for this discipline are the share of instructional faculty members who 
hold the rank of full professor (𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖) and the highest degree offered (𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖) only.  Suppose 
fifty percent of institution-𝑖𝑖’s instructional faculty members in the discipline hold the 
rank of full professor (thus, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 = 50) and the doctoral degree is the highest degree 
offered in the discipline (thus, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 = 1).  According to Equation 5, the conditional mean 
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of instructional costs per student credit hour for this discipline at institution 𝑖𝑖 is $255, 
because: 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 50, 1) = $200���
𝛽𝛽0
+ $0.10���
𝛽𝛽1
× 50�
𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + $50�𝛽𝛽2 × 1⏟𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 
 = $255                        (6) 
So far, we have expressed the conditional mean of instructional costs per student 
credit hour as a known function of various characteristics: in Equation 3 we specified the 
function in general form (as a function of 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 through 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖), and in Equation 5 we 
specified it, as an example, in specific form (as a function of 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖, only).  In 
reality, the conditional mean of instructional costs per student credit hour is an unknown 
function of various characteristics.  As such, we must estimate it.  
In principle, we could estimate the conditional mean for each discipline within 
each academic unit by estimating (using, say, ordinary least squares regression) the 
model specified in Equation 3, thereby ascertaining ?̂?𝛽0, ?̂?𝛽1, ?̂?𝛽2…?̂?𝛽𝑛𝑛, the estimates of 𝛽𝛽0, 
𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2…𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, respectively.  Then, we could multiply this discipline-specific conditional 
mean times the number of student credit hours the academic unit produced in that 
discipline in a given fiscal year.  Summing across all disciplines the unit instructed and 
dividing by all student credit hours the unit provided would yield an estimate of a unit’s 
instructional costs per student credit hour.   
To execute this approach requires, for each discipline and for a large sample of 
institutions, data on instructional costs per student credit hour (the 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 term in Equation 3) 
and data on various characteristics (the 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 terms in Equation 3). This approach also 
requires access to a large sample of institutions’ financial and credit hour generation 
information, as well as a properly specified model of the unknown and unobservable 
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process that generates instructional costs for each discipline (e.g., Equation 3).  As we 
have neither access to such a data set from a large number of institutions, nor discipline-
specific cost driver models, we proposed an alternative approach using the same 
conceptual framework, but instead of accessing each individual institution’s data, we use 
the Delaware Cost Study Database. 
 Our study included all academic departments from a public research university. 
The total instructional resources (as defined by NACUBO) for each department were 
analyzed for each department for a single fiscal year. This data was then compared using 
CIP (Classification of Instructional Program) codes to the Delaware Cost Study Database, 
which contains instructional expenses data from over 200 institutions, and has been 
described as affording a rational view of differentiated direct costs and credit hour 
production on which various decision-making tools can be built (Carrigan 2008). 
 In line with our conceptual framework, we propose to estimate the average 
instructional costs per student credit hour based on the discipline-specific, instructional 
costs of the unit’s peer institutions. We define a unit’s peer institutions as those that 
provide substantively similar instructional services using substantively similar inputs and 
instructional designs. 
Conceptually, then, we assume that peer institutions incur instructional costs per 
student credit hour according to a common, unobservable (and, thus, unknown) function 
of institution-specific characteristics—for example, we assume Equation 3.  Based on 
discipline-specific data (averaged across peer institutions) on the instructional costs of 
peer institutions, we estimate, for each discipline within each unit, the conditional mean 
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of instructional costs per student credit hour.  Our peer-group approach consists of three 
steps. 
First, we obtained the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code for each 
course taught at the university. Each course that an academic unit instructs corresponds to 
one or more fields of study.  The National Center for Educational Statistics assigns to 
each field of study a Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code.  The CIP 
taxonomy ranges from two-digit codes corresponding to general fields of study—for 
example, CIP 04 (Architecture and Related Services)—to four- and six-digit codes 
corresponding to specific fields of study—for example, CIP 04.09 (Architectural 
Sciences and Technology) and 04.0902 (Architectural and Building 
Sciences/Technology). 
Thus we obtained the single corresponding four-digit CIP code for each course 
that each academic unit instructed in a given fiscal year.  This course CIP-code 
information is typically readily available from an institution’s office of academic affairs. 
The Delaware Cost Study database reports instructional costs for fields of study identified 
by, at most, four-digit CIP codes.  Thus, in our approach, we must identify courses with 
four- or two-digit CIP codes, only. Once each course taught by the university had a 
corresponding CIP code attached to it, we then identified peer groups. 
In the second step of our peer-group approach, we selected, for each department 
within each academic college, 10 to 15 institutions from the most-current edition of the 
Delaware Cost Study database; these selections consist of institutions that the 
corresponding academic-unit’s leader identifies as department peers.  Hereafter, we refer 
to these peer groups as departmental peers. Academic-unit leaders looked at the highest 
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degree offered, size of the peer program, comparison of the department to the university’s 
mission (in Volk et al. [2001], this is could be considered centrality), and overall 
university Carnegie Classification, as well as any other factors deemed important by the 
academic leader pertaining to quality. These peers were then vetted and approved by 
deans of the respective colleges as well as the Vice President for Academic Affairs of the 
university. 
The Delaware Cost Study provided a good source of data from which to derive 
instructional costs, but this methodology is not without limitations. Since this is a 
voluntary survey response, not all schools are not represented. While the group of 
universities that participate in the Delaware Cost Study is around 200 annually, the 
limited pool may have resulted in less than optimal peer selections. In addition, some 
data, such as distribution of faculty ranks or a measure of program quality between the 
case study institution and the peer institutions, were not available so unit leaders had to 
select peers with limited knowledge and limited choices. Despite limitations of the data 
set and the methodology used, we still suggest that the Delaware Cost Study provides the 
best-known source for estimating cost of instruction. Although we acknowledge the 
limits of the study here, it is also important to acknowledge that eight of the 16 peer 
institutions identified by our case study university for analysis of funding per resident 
student FTE did also participate and were identified as peers in the Delaware Cost Study. 
This is a sample of the overlap of the two studies and the quality options available in the 
Delaware Cost Study peer selection. 
In addition to departmental peers, we selected, for the institution as a whole, 15 
institutions from the database; these selections consist of institutions that the Vice 
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President for Academic Affairs identifies as university peers.  Hereafter, we refer to this 
peer group as institutional peers. Finally, we selected the whole group of universities with 
a similar Carnegie Classification type as the case study university.  Hereafter, we refer to 
this group as national peers. By completing the analysis three times with three different 
peer groups, we aim to add validity to our departmental peer group analysis. 
After all of the peers were chosen, we estimated each academic unit’s average 
instructional costs per student credit hour based on the discipline-specific instructional 
costs of peer institutions, i.e., the conditional means. Data for instructional costs for a 
single peer institution are not available from the Delaware Cost Study database; rather, 
only data averaged across peer-group institutions are available.  
Therefore, we selected the peer group for a specific department (in the 
departmental peer analysis) and retrieved the average instructional costs for each CIP for 
that peer group1. We then multiplied the average direct instructional costs per student 
credit hour times the associated number of student credit hours the academic unit 
produced in a given fiscal year. Summing across all courses the academic unit instructed 
and dividing by all student credit hours the academic unit provided yields the estimate of 
an academic unit’s direct instructional costs per student credit hour. 
Patterns in instructional costs based on the Delaware Cost Study database are 
consistent with patterns in instructional costs in higher education more generally.  
Specifically, instructional costs vary more widely across disciplines for a given 
institutional type, than across institutional types for a given a discipline (Middaugh, 
                                                          
1 Note the hierarchy for CIP matching for department peers was as follows: 4-digit CIP from department 
peers, 2-digit CIP from department peers, 4-digit CIP from institutional peers, 2-digit CIP from institutional 
peers, 4-digit CIP from national peers, 2-digit CIP from national peer. This was done so that every credit 
hour taught by the university had a corresponding average instructional cost per student credit hour. 
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Graham, and Shahid 2003).  For example, engineering programs at national peers incur, 
on average, instructional costs per student credit hour somewhat equal to engineering 
programs at comprehensive institutions, on average, but psychology programs at national 
peers incur, on average, instructional costs per student credit hour significantly lower 
than engineering programs at either institution.   
As we know, input and instructional design characteristics drive these patterns in 
instructional costs per student credit hour across disciplines and institutional types.  
Presumably, based on these patterns, input and instructional design characteristics vary 
more widely across disciplines for a given institutional type, than across institutional 
types for a given a discipline (Middaugh, Graham, and Shahid 2003).  Thus, taken 
together, these summary statistics support our conceptual framework in general and our 
peer-group approach in particular, with which we estimate average instructional costs per 
student credit hour in a discipline, conditioned on discipline-specific input and 
instructional-design characteristics that drive these instructional costs. 
Type of Study 
 In order to operationalize the conceptual theoretical frameworks described here, 
an exploratory case study was used. This study gathered data on state support per resident 
student FTE for a group of peer institutions in order to analyze the variations in funding 
and the volatility across years. It also contains discussion on the equity of the distribution 
of instructional resources within a single research institution. Finally, it analyzes the use 
of differential tuition within a research university and a comparison of these tuition 
differentials to national cost of instruction data and salary by major data.  
Description of Study 
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 This study is composed of three parts. The first part will contain a survey 
conducted of 17 peer institutions regarding state support per resident full-time equivalent 
students and an analysis of the variation in funding and the variation over years by 
institution. The second part of this study will analyze how universities distribute their 
instructional resources, including differential tuition as discussed in part one, to test 
whether there is an equitable distribution when taking into account cost structures and 
market forces, as well as testing if there are any specific disciplines that are underfunded. 
The third part will include an analysis of differential pricing in higher education and the 
testing of theories as to why universities price the way they do.  
State Support per Resident Student FTE 
 The literature review identified a lack of literature and data for normalized state 
support per resident student FTE. Based on this lack of literature, a survey tool was 
developed to capture the data for our group of peer institutions. The survey tool was then 
expanded to help explore the research questions. The first step in designing the survey 
tool was to give each participating university a similar starting point for its state support 
appropriations and full-time equivalent student enrollment. In order to do this, data was 
collected from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS) website 
(U.S. Department of Education 2017). This data was then populated into each of the 17 
universities’ specific templates to fill out. The survey was reviewed by a panel of experts 
and directions, definitions, and the template were completed based on their feedback.  
 The survey instrument, in Appendix A, contained survey directions, IPEDS 
variable definitions, a sample completed survey for the case study university, and two 
questions for each of three years of data with the IPEDS starting point data already filled 
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in. The first survey question for each fiscal year was for universities to subtract any state 
appropriations in their IPEDS data not directly related to core teaching or university 
overhead. Examples such as, Agricultural Experiment Station, Cooperative Extension 
Service, medical school, Animal Research and Diagnostic Lab were listed for 
respondents to record the amounts of these non-core teaching or university overhead 
missions. Additional spaces were included for universities to enter other state 
appropriations not directly related to core teaching and university overhead. 
 The second question in each fiscal year’s survey was for universities to subtract 
any non-resident or non-state support students. Examples included all FTE (both resident 
and non-resident) taking non-state supported courses, all non-resident FTE on state 
supported courses, medical school students and other non-resident and non-state support 
students. Additional spaces were provided for other non-resident and non-state supported 
students. 
 The surveys were then e-mailed with at least two follow-up emails and two phone 
calls, with requests for the data. Of the seventeen universities selected, eight completed 
and returned the survey for a response rate of 47%. 
Differential Pricing in Higher Education 
This study focuses on a single research institution with 39 different instructional 
units. These instructional units were the unit of analysis. The intent was to develop a 
methodology based on the theoretical framework to test first, if in the face of decreasing 
state support, the university was pricing education more like a for-profit firm. In order to 
test this, a time series of state general fund compared to student support for a single 
university will be graphed against the number of programs with discipline fees. The result 
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will test if this university’s trend aligns with the statements in the literature review 
stating: universities are increasing the use of differential tuition in the face of reductions 
in state support (Nelson 2008; Strange 2015).  
The second portion of the analysis on differential pricing in higher education will 
focus on testing if the theories of cost-based pricing and marginal utility, specifically 
consumer surplus, explain the differential pricing structures in higher education. In order 
to operationalize the concept of cost-based pricing, we will use data from the Delaware 
Cost Study and the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
under the heading Conceptual Model for the Instructional Equity Analysis. Based on this 
conceptual model, we will extract for each of the 39 instructional units an instructional 
cost per credit hour based on their peers. This will serve as one of our independent 
variables in order to test the significance of cost-based pricing on differential tuition. 
The other independent variable in our regression analysis is consumer surplus. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 under the heading Theoretical Framework for Price Differentials, 
consumer surplus will be different for each individual based on preference, ability, and 
financial return. In order to operationalize this concept, we will focus on the financial 
return portion of consumer surplus. We will use the median salaries for alumni with 
degrees in this major with zero to five years of experience from PayScale.com (2017); for 
purposes of this study, we will refer to these data as starting salary. Using this data, we 
were able to find relative matches for 32 out of the 39 instructional units. Finally, any 
units that are funded within the university as self-supporting, that is, without a subsidy of 
state-support dollars, will be eliminated from the model. The reason is that this outlier 
would be expected to have a significantly higher differential price than all other 
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instructional units did, as all other units are subsidized by state support dollars. There was 
only one unit structured without state support. Removing this outlier, our final group is 
31 instructional units for Fiscal Year 2015. Fiscal Year 2014 had 29 observations as cost 
data for two of the instructional units were not available for Fiscal Year 2014. 
The dependent variable in our regression is differential tuition. To operationalize 
this variable, we found the price of each of these programs using the university’s board of 
regents’ website. We used FY15 pricing data for the analysis, as our starting salary data 
was for 2016-2017. Therefore, FY15 would have been the last full year of prices prior to 
entering the workforce in 2016.  
The regression analysis tested here will take the form of Equation 1. Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 
represents the price charge per student credit hour in a discipline 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represent the cost 
of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represent the expected starting salary of discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents 
the random component of price per student credit hour. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (1) 
In addition to running Equation 1, for the starting salary of a discipline, Equation 
2 will be run where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a discipline 
𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represent the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represent the expected median mid-career 
salary of discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit 
hour. In this case, 𝛽𝛽1 measures the change in price per student credit hour, given a one-
unit change in the cost of instruction.  Similarly, 𝛽𝛽2 measures the change in price per 
student credit hour given a one-unit change in the expected mid-career salary. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (2) 
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Analytic Method 
 In order to analyze research question #3, in the face of decreasing state support, 
are public universities pricing education more like a for profit firm?, we will use 
descriptive statistics to see if the university is using more cost-based pricing, like a for-
profit firm, as state support decreases. In order to analyze this state funding as a 
percentage of the university’s overall budget, it will be graphed against the number of 
instructional units using program fees for the 15 years from 2002-2003 through 2016-
2017. 
To analyze research question #4, do the theories of cost-based pricing and 
marginal utility, specifically consumer surplus, explain the differential tuition pricing 
structures in higher education?, we will run a regression analysis to determine if a 
relationship existed between the dependent variable, price, and the independent variables: 
cost of instruction and starting salary. The regression analysis tested here will take the 
form of Equation 1. Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a 
discipline 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 represent the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represent the expected starting 
salary of discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit 
hour. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
In interpreting the results of the equation, a two-tail p value will be determined to 
be significant at the 95% confidence level for each variable and the model. In addition, 
the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 will be used to identify the change in the dependent variable for each 
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one-unit change in the independent variable. Finally, R2 statistical measure will tell us 
how well our independent variables predict the change in the dependent variable, price.  
A regression analysis of Equation 2 will also be run and the same test and 
interpretations described will be used. Following that analysis, we will compare the 
results of Equation 2 to Equation 1 to see if either of them more accurately predicts the 
price. 
 The data used in the regression equations presented help us to avoid reverse 
causality. In Equations 1 and 2 we use the Delaware Costs Study instructional costs of the 
selected peers. By using peer instructional costs as opposed to the case study institution’s 
expenditure data, we avoid reverse causality. One can see how using the case institution’s 
expenditure data could cause concerns of reverse causality. If we had used the case 
institution’s expenditures, it could be argued that as the university increased its 
differential tuition for a specific program that increase in price resulted in that unit 
increasing its expenditures because of the additional revenue. In our model, though, it 
would be difficult for us to argue that the price at our case study university caused an 
increase in expenditures of selected peers, with locations spanning across the country. As 
a result, we suggest that our 𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 variable, peer cost of instruction, affects our case study 
institution’s price, and not the other way around, allowing us to avoid reverse causality. 
 A similar argument can be made with our 𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 variable, starting salary (or, in the 
case of Equation 2, mid-career salary). If we had used the starting salary of students from 
the case study institution, there could be an argument that the price of the program at the 
case university affected the quality of education (either positively or negatively) and 
therefore affected the starting salary. In our analysis, we used national data from 
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PayScale.com; as a result, we are confident that the tuition price of a specific program at 
the case university does not affect the starting salary of individuals throughout the 
country with that major. Therefore, we believe our second variable is also not suspect to 
reverse causality.  
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FINDINGS 
 This chapter will provide the results of the analyses described in the methodology 
section. It will provide and analyze the results from the state funding per resident student 
FTE findings. Additionally, it will include descriptive statistics comparing state general 
funding to the implementation of differential tuition for our case study. Finally, it will 
provide and analyze the output from the regression model and the associated descriptive 
statistics. Section one will focus on how state funding per resident student FTE varies 
between peer institutions (Research Question 1), and if state funding trends from year to 
year are similar for all peer institution, and if variations exist in a given year by 
institution (Research Question 2). Section two will focus on analyzing, in the face of 
decreasing state support, whether public universities are pricing education more like a 
for-profit firm (Research Question 3). Section two will then provide the regression 
analysis examining whether the theories of cost-based pricing and marginal utility, 
specifically consumer surplus, explain the differential tuition pricing structures in higher 
education (Research Question 4).  
State Support per Resident Student FTE 
The survey on state support per resident student FTE yielded eight results from 
our survey of seventeen peer institution. Research Question #1 set out to find how state 
funding per resident student FTE varies between peer institutions. Our survey design 
aimed to gather comparable data that may be lacking in other surveys by gathering state 
funds for core teaching and university overhead and dividing that by the resident state 
support student FTE (See figure 4).  
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Figure 1. Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident Student FTE 
 
The Fiscal Year 2013 funding per state support resident student FTE ranged from 
$5,459 for Peer University #5 to $21,726 for Peer University #6. The mean was $9,629 
and the median value was $8,101 per state support resident student FTE. 
The Fiscal Year 2014 funding per state support resident student FTE ranged from 
$6,295 for Peer University #7 to $20,256 for Peer University #6. The mean was $9,802 
and the median value was $8,418 per state support resident student FTE. 
The Fiscal Year 2015 funding per state support resident student FTE ranged from 
$6,408 for Peer University #1 to $21,603 for Peer University #6. The mean was $10,422 
and the median value was $8,683 per state support resident student FTE. 
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In response to the research question of how does state funding per resident student 
FTE vary between peer institution, our findings would suggest that there is a wide 
variation in funding per resident FTE. The university with the largest funding per resident 
student FTE reported nearly four times the funding per resident student FTE as the 
university that reported the least funding per resident student FTE. Similarly, the second 
and third university with the largest funding per resident student FTE are nearly double 
the funding per FTE of the three universities with the least funding per resident student 
FTE. 
We will go into the discussion of these data in more depth in our final chapter, but 
it important to note what these finding are saying (and not saying). These findings do not 
reflect the total resources of core teaching and university overhead, as the non-resident 
mix at these schools may vary, thus providing additional funding for the university as 
non-residents typically pay a larger tuition rate compared to residents. Since both the 
state appropriations and the resident student FTE are moving from year to year, increases 
or decreases in the state appropriations per state support resident student FTE cannot be 
assumed to track with nominal increases or decreases in state funding. If states tied 
funding to the number of resident student FTE, these assumptions could be made; but 
since we have not analyzed the distribution mechanism for each of these universities, that 
assumption could not be made. 
What these findings do test are the levels that states invest in their resident state 
support students. These findings show that states invest in their resident students at very 
different levels. While these results do not estimate the whole financial picture of these 
universities, since state appropriations are the base of a state support institution, these 
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results suggest that these universities have very different starting points for their financial 
base. 
The second research question asked if state funding trends from year to year are 
similar for all peer institution, or if variations exist in a given year by institution (See 
Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Estimated Percentage Change in State Appropriations per State Support 
Resident Student FTE 
 
 The percentage change in state appropriations per state support resident student 
FTE for fiscal year 2014 varies from a decrease of 6.8% for Peer University #6 to an 
increase of 15.8% for Peer University #5. The mean change was a positive 4.2% and the 
median value was 4.0%. 
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 The percentage change in state appropriations per state support resident student 
FTE for fiscal year 2015 varies from a decrease of 0.4% for Peer University #1 to an 
increase of 13.1% for Peer University #4. The mean change was a positive 6.1% and the 
median value was 5.5%. 
Therefore, the data show that the state funding trends in our limited sample vary 
greatly by institution for a given year. In fiscal year 2014, three institution had state 
appropriations per resident student FTE of greater than 6.0%, while two institutions had 
growth between 0.0% and 6.0%, and the remaining three institutions experienced 
decreases between 0.9% and 6.8%. 
In fiscal year 2015, four institutions had state appropriations per resident student 
FTE of greater than 6.0%, while three institution had growth between 0.0% and 6.0%, 
and the one remaining institution experienced a decrease of 0.4%. The funding variations 
in fiscal year 2014 and 2015 from our survey would suggest that a signification amount 
of variation in state funding per resident student FTE exists by institution for a given 
year. Even in fiscal year 2015, in which all but one of the universities experienced an 
increase in state funding per resident student FTE, the funding growth experienced by 
each institution varied greatly. 
State General Funding Trends Compared to the Implementation of Differential Tuition 
 Research question three set out to test if our case study aligned with the 
statements in existing literature that universities were increasingly using state support 
tuition in the face of decreasing state general funds (Nelson 2008). In order to analyze 
this, we looked at 15 years of data, Fiscal Year 2002 to Fiscal Year 2016, to compare the 
percentage of general fund support for higher education versus the implementation of 
programs with differential tuition. 
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 First, we analyzed the trend of state general funds for the state in which the case 
study took place, as one can see in Figure 3; over this 15-year period, the funding from 
state support decreased from 57% to 44%, while the funding from student support 
increased from 43% to 56% (Data from Case Study Institution). This trend is consistent 
with the literature review of state funding trends in the U.S. 
Figure 3. Comparison of Student Support to General Fund Support 
 
 For the same time period, we then analyzed the number of undergraduate 
programs with differential tuition (Data from Case Study Institution). This data also 
followed the trend in the literature review suggesting that the use of differential tuition 
has been increasing. The number of programs with differential tuition increased from 5 in 
Fiscal Year 2002 to 21 in Fiscal Year 2016, as can be seen in Figure 4. In addition, the 
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average amount of the program fee grew from $24.25 to $75.24 over the time period, 
resulting in an increase of 310%, as opposed to the increase in tuition which rose from 
$106.06 to $238.50, resulting in an increase of 225%. 
Figure 4. Number of Programs with Differential Tuition 
 
 Finally, comparing the percentage of state general funds to the number of 
programs with differential tuition, one can confidently say that the long-term trend shows 
an inverse relationship; see Figure 5, suggesting that this case study supports the previous 
literature (Nelson 2008), indicating that as state funding decreases, universities use 
differential tuition. 
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Figure 5. Comparison between Percentage of State General Funds versus Number 
of Programs with Differential Tuition 
 
 
Differential Tuition Pricing Drivers 
Starting Salary 
Research question four set out to test if the theories of cost-based pricing and 
marginal utility, specifically consumer surplus, explain the differential tuition pricing in 
higher education. The operationalization of the cost-based pricing was done using the 
Delaware Cost Study database, as described earlier. For the first regression, the consumer 
surplus was operationalized using the starting salary (PayScale.com 2017). The 
regression formula took the form: 
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a discipline 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 
represent the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represent the expected starting salary of discipline i, 
and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit hour. 
Using this regression with fiscal year 2015 data, the intercept and starting salary 
were found to be significant with p-values of <.0001. Cost of instruction was also found 
to be significant with a p-value of .0036. The β coefficients for the regression were 
109.989 for the intercept, 0.102 for the cost of instruction, and 2.449 for the starting 
salary. Resulting in Equation 7: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 109.989 + 0.102𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 2.449𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (7) 
The results of the regression suggest that for each dollar increase in the cost of 
instruction, price would be expected to increase by $0.102, and for each thousand dollar 
increase in starting salary, the price would be expected to increase by $2.449, with an 
intercept of $109.989. The R2 statistical measure for this regression was 0.774, 
suggesting that 77.4% of the variation in price can be explained by our equation. 
In order to test for autocorrelation in the residuals, a Durbin-Watson statistic was 
calculated. With our sample, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Statistic with a 
significance level of .05 are a lower bound (dU ) of 1.6 and an upper bound (4- dU ) of 2.4. 
Therefore, since our test statistic of 1.9 falls within the range of dU and 4-dU, we can 
reject the null hypotheses of no positive and no negative autocorrelation at the 5 percent 
significance level (Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
We then repeated this analysis with early career data for fiscal year 2014. This 
analysis had 29 observations. Using this regression with fiscal year 2014 data the 
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intercept and starting salary were found to be significant with p-values of <.0001. Cost of 
instruction was also found to be significant with a p-value of .0009. The β coefficients for 
the regression were 121.407 for the intercept, 0.148 for the cost of instruction, and 1.960 
for the starting salary, resulting in Equation 8: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 121.407 + 0.148𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 1.960𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (8) 
The results of the regression suggest that for each dollar increase in the cost of 
instruction, price would be expected to increase by $0.148, and for each thousand dollar 
increase in starting salary, the price would be expected to increase by $1.960, with an 
intercept of $121.407. The R2 statistical measure for this regression was 0.803, 
suggesting that 80.3% of the variation in price can be explained by our equation. 
In order to test for autocorrelation in the residuals, a Durbin-Watson statistic was 
calculated. With our sample, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Statistic with a 
significance level of .05 are a lower bound (dU ) of 1.6 and an upper bound (4- dU ) of 2.4. 
Therefore, since our test statistic of 1.6 falls within the range of dU and 4-dU, we can 
reject the null hypotheses of no positive and no negative autocorrelation at the 5 percent 
significance level (Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
Mid-Career Salary 
For the next regression, the consumer surplus was operationalization using the 
mid-career salary (PayScale.com 2017). The regression formula took the form: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the price charged per student credit hour in a discipline𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 
represent the cost of discipline i, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖 represent the expected mid-career salary of 
discipline i, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 represents the random component of price per student credit hour. 
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Using fiscal year 2015 data, this regression the intercept, cost of instruction, and 
mid-career salary were found to be significant with p-values of <.0001. The β coefficients 
for the regression were 131.395 for the intercept, 0.162 for the cost of instruction, and 
0.973 for the mid-career salary, resulting in Equation 9: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 131.395 + 0.162𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 0.973𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (9) 
The results of the regression suggest that for each dollar increase in the cost of 
instruction, price would be expected to increase by $0.162, and for each thousand-dollar 
increase in mid-career salary, the price would be expected to increase by $0.973, with an 
intercept of $131.395. The R2 statistical measure for this regression was 0.669, 
suggesting that 66.9% of the variation in price can be explained by our equation. 
In order to test for autocorrelation in the residuals, a Durbin-Watson statistic was 
calculated. With our sample, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Statistic with a 
significance level of .05 are a lower bound (dU ) of 1.6 and an upper bound (4- dU ) of 2.4. 
Therefore, since our test statistic of 2.2 falls within the range of dU and 4-dU, we can 
reject the null hypotheses of no positive and no negative autocorrelation at the 5 percent 
significance level (Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
We then repeated the analysis using fiscal year 2014 data; in this regression, the 
intercept and cost of instruction were found to be significant with p-values of <.0001. The 
mid-career salary was also found to be significant at the .0009 level. The β coefficients 
for the regression were 137.29 for the intercept, 0.218 for the cost of instruction, and 
0.722 for the mid-career salary, resulting in Equation 10: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 137.293 + 0.218𝑥𝑥1,𝑖𝑖 + 0.722𝑥𝑥2,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (10) 
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The results of the regression suggest that for each dollar increase in the cost of 
instruction, price would be expected to increase by $0.218, and for each thousand-dollar 
increase in mid-career salary, the price would be expected to increase by $0.722, with an 
intercept of $137.293. The R2 statistical measure for this regression was 0.758, 
suggesting that 75.8% of the variation in price can be explained by our equation. 
In order to test for autocorrelation in the residuals, a Durbin-Watson statistic was 
calculated. With our sample, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Statistic with a 
significance level of .05 are a lower bound (dU ) of 1.6 and an upper bound (4- dU ) of 2.4. 
Therefore, since our test statistic of 1.7 falls within the range of dU and 4-dU, we can 
reject the null hypotheses of no positive and no negative autocorrelation at the 5 percent 
significance level (Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
Comparing the starting salary regression to the mid-career salary in both of our 
fiscal years, it appears, based on the R2, that the starting salary regression might be a 
better predictor of price. This data would follow our hypothesis that as universities set 
their differential pricing based on consumer surplus theory, they focus on the starting 
salary of the major when pricing rather than focusing on the lifetime earnings, which 
would be better represented by the mid-career salary. This may suggest that students 
focus on the ability to pay off student loans upon graduation when calculating their 
consumer surplus, or that universities assume that students focus on the ability to pay off 
student loans upon graduation when calculating their consumer surplus. Regardless of 
whether it is the student’s actual consumer surplus or the university’s assumptions, it 
appears that pricing is more highly correlated with quick payoffs (starting salary) than 
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with the longer term, and possibly more accurate lifetime return on investment (mid-
career salary).  
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DISCUSSION 
 This chapter contains four different sections. The first section provides a summary 
of the entire paper including the review of literature, methodology, and findings. The 
second sections reviews the conclusions based on the analysis. The third section contains 
a discussion based on the findings and the conclusions of the study. The last section of 
this chapter includes limitations, recommendations for practice, and recommendations for 
future research. 
Summary 
 At the outset of this project our goal was to better understand who is paying for 
higher education and why. Understanding the current state of higher education funding is 
extremely important as the theoretical debate of how higher education should be funded 
continues to increase in intensity. The results from our analysis show that there is a large 
variation in state funding of higher education across peer institutions and that these 
funding differences greatly vary from year to year. These findings suggest that state 
economies and political forces have a large impact on higher education finance and, 
although it is important to understand the national trends, it is important for policy 
makers and researchers to also focus on individual states, as there are large structural 
variations as well as significantly different variation from year to year. This data will be 
useful to help keep the focus on individual state’s decisions as well as to provide them 
with accurate benchmarking with other states and universities.  
 Additionally, to contribute to the knowledge of higher education funding, the 
pricing structure of a case study university was analyzed and explanatory theories and 
variables were developed and supported by regression analysis. These findings show that 
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as state support decreases universities are taking on pricing characteristics typically found 
in a for-profit firm. The findings supporting the theory that higher education is 
increasingly using cost-based pricing and identifying the programs with the highest 
projected consumer surplus are significant in many respects. First, these findings allow 
researchers and policy makers to analyze the pricing impact of continued decreases in 
state funding of higher education. Secondly, this information allows universities to 
analyze and compare their pricing methodology with that of the case study university.  
The findings also add significant information to the discussion of disinvestment of 
certain majors; findings of this study would suggest that certain high cost programs with 
lower relative starting salaries are actually being subsidized more than high cost 
programs (such as some of the STEM fields) that have higher starting salaries. To 
describe this concept, consider two majors that have the same cost of instruction, $300 
per credit hour, for example. Also, assume that one of these majors is a STEM field, 
which, all else equal, typically demands a higher starting salary than a humanities major. 
The findings in this analysis would suggest that the STEM major would have a larger 
differential tuition due to the higher starting salary. For this example, we will assume that 
base tuition for each of these majors covers $100 per credit hour of the instruction costs 
and the differential tuition on the STEM program is $50 per credit hour. Analyzing the 
how the $300 cost of instruction per credit hour for these two majors is funded shows that 
the STEM major is funded by $100 base tuition, $50 differential tuition, and $150 of state 
general funds (as state general funds is the only other source of instructional revenue). On 
the other hand, the humanities $300 cost of instruction per credit hour is funded by $100 
base tuition, $0 differential tuition, and $200 of state support. As a result, the STEM 
71 
 
major would receive $150 of state support per credit, while the humanities major would 
receive $200 per credit hour of state support. This illustrates a numerical example of the 
findings from this research, which supports the statement that certain high cost programs 
with lower relative starting salaries are actually being subsidized more than high cost 
programs (such as some of the STEM fields) that have higher starting salaries.  
Most importantly, this analysis can provide data that can help inform debates on 
how we could fund higher education, as this analysis provides us with a common 
understanding of how we are currently funding higher education. These debates will be 
extremely important and will shape the future of higher education in America.  
Conclusions 
 The main conclusions from this analysis are that state support per resident state 
support student FTE varies greatly between institutions, meaning that the starting 
resource base for peer universities can be very different. In addition, variation from year 
to year can be significant, with some universities seeing decreases in state funding per 
resident FTE in the same years that others see significant increases. As for funding within 
the university, it was found that market forces and cost structures can account for 
instructional funding differences and, in our case study university, no groups of discipline 
areas were systematically inequitably funded. These findings were contrary to previous 
studies. 
The study also found that decreases in state general funds are correlated with 
increases in the number of undergraduate programs charging differential tuition. Further, 
the analysis also found cost of instruction, early career salary, and mid-career salary for a 
given program were positively correlated with the price a university charges for that 
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program. These factors were also found to be very strong predictors of price. As a result 
of these conclusions, we suggest that the theories of cost-based pricing and marginal 
utility, specifically consumer surplus, can be used to explain pricing differentials in 
higher education. 
Discussion 
 This study provides an analysis of equity in funding in higher education from a 
variety of perspectives. It includes a survey of peer institutions to analyze their state 
funding per resident state support student FTE and the variation in the percentage change 
across peer universities for a given year; it also provides a methodology for analyzing the 
equity of instructional resources distributions, and analyzes the revenue and pricing for 
our case study institution. 
State Support per Resident Student FTE 
 In theory, states use general funds to support the higher education of the residents 
of that state. This theory can be seen in the tuition pricing structure in which non-
residents pay a higher tuition rate than residents of the state. The difference between the 
two prices, in theory, could be thought of as the state general fund appropriations 
subsidizing the tuition of the resident, compared to the non-resident who bears the full 
cost of education.  
 Based on this theory, it would be important for university leaders and policy 
makers to have comparable data on how much each state is subsidizing its resident 
students compared to how much other states subsidize their resident students. Current 
data on this topic contains flaws, one flaw is gathering comparable state appropriations 
for the universities base mission, because the data includes Agricultural Experiment 
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Stations, Cooperative Extensions Services, medical schools, or any other non-core 
operation that is within the university that receives revenue from the state. The other 
flaws that exist in data sources relate to getting the resident state supported student FTE 
isolated. Analyzing all FTE includes non-residents who in theory are not subsidized by 
the state and who pay a higher tuition rate in most cases. The survey utilized in this study 
provides comparable data on state appropriations per resident state supported student 
FTE that can be used by policy makers and institutional leaders. 
 The results of this survey show a large variation in the state support per resident 
student FTE between universities. This finding suggests that universities have large 
differences in their base funding to execute their mission. These variations would be 
expected to have impacts on faculty to student ratios, pricing of both resident and non-
resident tuition, and the use of differential pricing. Widening this study to more 
universities and over more years could help policy makers, university leadership, and 
researchers have a better understanding of the differences between universities and 
provide data for them to make data informed decisions. 
 The results of the survey also show a large variation in funding changes between 
universities for a given year. This data suggest that states are probably not funding 
universities based on the services provided to the resident students of that state. If that 
were the case, we would expect much less variation from year to year. Secondly, it 
suggests that in addition to national long-term trends on funding higher education, state 
short-term issues may have a very significant impact on public university funding. This 
hypothesis may not be overly surprising, as states try to balance their budgets using the 
“balancing wheel" between healthcare, safety, and education; each state’s political, 
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economic, and structural issues may be more influential than national trends on higher 
education (Hovey 1999; Kramer 2011, Tandberg 2010). 
Equitable Distribution of Instructional Resources 
 In addition to analyzing the variables involved in pricing in higher education, this 
study also analyzed the distribution of instructional resources in higher education. The 
distribution of instructional resources in higher education currently has a brief body of 
literature behind it. Existing studies fail to take into account market forces and cost 
structures when analyzing the equitable distribution of instructional resources (Newfield 
2009; Santos 2007; Volk et al. 2001). Our analysis includes data from the Delaware Cost 
Study in order to benchmark each department against its peers and then summarizes it at 
the college level to see if any specific discipline areas are systematically underfunded. 
 In contrast to previous studies, our analysis when taking into account market 
forces and cost structures did not find specific discipline areas that were inequitably 
funded. As a result in our case study university, although there were differences in 
funding, we found that market forces and cost structures did account for most of the 
instructional funding differences when compared to the previous literature. It is important 
to note that these finding are for the specific university studied compared to the national 
average; therefore, it does not and will not account for a national disinvestment in a given 
instructional unit. Instead, it addresses whether the distribution at this university was 
equitable when compared to national peers. 
Pricing Structures in Higher Education 
 The pricing of higher education is an often-debated topic. Opinions on the topic 
are passionately argued, specifically when it comes to the private and public good 
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components of higher education, affordable access to higher education, and differential 
pricing of higher education. 
 The public versus private good of higher education continues to be a topic of 
discussion for higher education. The theory of the public good of higher education 
suggests that there are positive externalities that are enjoyed by those who did not directly 
pay for the education, for example, less crime as a result of increased education 
(Marginson 2007). On the private side of the argument, students who obtain a degree 
though higher education have the opportunities to secure superior incomes (Marginson 
2007). While both of these theories are sound, the debate remains as to how much of 
higher education is a public good and how much is private. Importantly, as a result of 
these two types of goods, the question arises as to who should pay for higher education 
and what portion should be paid by the individuals and what portion paid by society.  
 The data analyzed in this study would suggest that higher education is being 
increasingly priced more as a private good. The research shows that funding of higher 
education has been decreasing and that an increasing amount of the burden is being paid 
by the student (American Academy of Arts and Science 2016a, 2016b; Feldman 2012; 
State Higher Education Executive Officers Association 2015; National Association of 
State Budget Officers 2014). In our case study, it can be seen that the general fund 
support decreased from 57% of the support to 44% (Data from Case Study Institution). In 
response to this change, the case study institution increased its number of programs with 
differential tuition from 5 to 21 over that period. These findings support previous 
literature suggesting that as state funding decreases, universities will use differential 
tuition at an increasing rate (Nelson 2008).  
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 As noted earlier in this analysis, this behavior makes sense; as universities 
become less subsidized by the state they will increasingly take on characteristics of for-
profit firms. While we suggest that they will take on some characteristics of these firms, 
it is important to note that we are not suggesting they will become for-profit firms, 
merely that they will take on some characteristics of these firms. One can think of this on 
the spectrum of not-for-profit entities; the entities that are extremely highly subsidized 
would be expected to price and behave differently than not-for-profit entities that 
received no subsidies. We are suggesting that, as state funding decreases, universities will 
behave more like the non-subsidized entities than the heavily subsidized entities and as a 
result we would expect them to increasingly take on characteristics of a for-profit firm, 
all else equal. One of these characteristics is cost-based pricing. 
 Cost-based pricing was used as one of the variables in our regression analysis 
used to understand the variables that make up a university’s decision to charge 
differential tuition for undergraduate programs and the amount. As discussed, as 
universities see a decrease in state support funding they are increasing their use of 
differential tuition. Using the practices of a for-profit firm, they will begin to price their 
products differently as they move along the spectrum. In for-profit firms, if the cost of 
making a specific good is more than the price the firm is able to charge, one would expect 
the firm to stop making that product and instead focus its resources on the products that 
that it can produce at a cost less that the market clearing price they can charge. Therefore, 
as universities decide which undergraduate programs to charge differential tuition to, we 
would expect them to charge their high cost programs to defray the high costs of those 
programs as opposed to charging it to programs with low costs.  
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 As universities receive less of their resources from the state and an increasing 
amount from students, we also suggest in our model that an individual’s early career 
salary will be important. Our rationale for including this variable is the theory of 
marginal utility, specifically consumer surplus. Our reason for using this theory is 
focused on the analysis done by the price setters at the university. It is very important to 
understand how we are using this theory and also how we are not using this theory. We 
are suggesting that university price setters who are trying to increase revenues for the 
university, in light of reduced state funding, will try to increase revenues without losing 
students, as losing students would be counterproductive to their revenue stream. As these 
price setters assess which programs to raise price on, we suggest that they will try to 
estimate the consumer surplus for the students in each major. As many of the factors that 
go into consumer surplus are unknown to the price setter, they will simply focus on the 
general consumer surplus factors that apply to the majority of the students: the price of 
the degree and the expected financial return of the degree. As stated, there are far more 
factors that are involved in an individual’s consumer surplus calculation, but price and 
financial return are the most applicable to all students. Of course, there are exceptions to 
these factors, such as an individual who is independently wealthy and does not include 
financial return in their calculation or an individual who wants a specific degree for the 
enjoyment of learning rather than financial return. But we suggest that the price setters 
cannot make sweeping assumptions based on these examples; therefore, we suggest they 
will use the information they have available regarding the factors that they believe to be 
applicable to the most students. We suggest that price setters will assume that price of 
degree and financial return on the degree are the two factors of consumer surplus that 
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they can analyze. As stated, it is important to note how we are not using this theory. We 
are not suggesting that all (or even most) students make their decisions based on financial 
return on a degree; we are simply saying these are the only factors on which price setters 
have readily available information.  
 Our regression analysis found both of these theories to be significant and the 
combination of these two theories had a very large explanatory power for the price of a 
degree. The fact that both of these theories are significant is interesting to analyze. 
Because cost of instruction is significant, universities are starting to price differently 
based on the cost of each “product,” as we would expect. The second significant variable  
suggests that universities also look at the return on investment and price accordingly. 
Combining these two concepts would suggest that for two high cost programs, it would 
be conceivable that they could both cost the same to produce (in which case cost-based 
pricing if used alone would suggest that they would be priced similarly), but higher 
education price setters are willing to charge less for one of the degree programs simply 
because its majors are expected to make less in their early career. Using this simple 
example would suggest that higher education, in this case, is subsidizing the high cost 
programs with low early career salaries at a higher rate than high cost programs with 
higher early career salaries. This concept may contradict some who suggest that higher 
education is disinvesting in the humanities, which have been classified as high cost with 
lower income, and instead would suggest that higher education is maintaining the state 
subsidy of the humanities at the expense of STEM programs who on average have higher 
early career salaries. Of course, this is a single observation and further research would 
need to be done to support this finding. 
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 Another finding from this study was that early career salary was a better predictor 
of price than mid-career salary. As discussed, we are suggesting that price setters are 
using the information available to set price and that our model may only reflect a small 
subset of the reasons students select certain majors. Combining these two ideas may 
suggest that price setters either: 1. Believe that students’ consumer surplus is influenced 
more by early career salary than mid-career salary, or; 2. That price setters are more 
concerned with early career salary rather than mid-career salary. A rational choice 
argument could be made for either one of these ideas. 
First, the price setters could believe that students are concerned more about the 
short term (early career salary), than the long term (mid-career salary). With an increased 
amount of the cost of education being paid by the students, there is an increase in the 
need for student loans. A rational choice argument could be made that the price setter 
would assume that the students are more short term motivated than long term because the 
repayment of student loans for these students will happen in the short term and not the 
long term. 
Secondly, with the increased political scrutiny on student debt, a rational choice 
argument could be made that as the price setters are deciding which programs to apply 
differential tuition to, that they are aware and concerned with students’ short term ability 
to pay back the debt. This could result in them acting in their own self-interest and trying 
to avoid putting additional debt on students who will have trouble paying the debt back in 
the short run. There are multiple reasons that price setters may be interested in the 
student’s ability to pay back loans. First, there could be a general concern for the well-
being of students, but beyond that, there are rational choice reasons for price setters to be 
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concerned. If students are not able to pay back their debt, it could result in negative 
publicity for the university. This negative publicity could have negative impacts on 
recruiting, as well as negative impacts on how the state views its investment in higher 
education, which could ultimately result in decreased state funding. Additionally, bad 
publicity could result in increased reporting and compliance rules, which increases the 
university’s expenses.  
Both of these theories could explain the rationale for price setters to focus on 
early career salary when assessing differential tuition. From a rational choice perspective, 
as shown here, there are sound explanations as to why early career salary is used when 
assessing differential tuition as opposed to mid-career salary. From a long term 
investment perspective, which is how we would characterize higher education 
investments, it is interesting though that the short run gains (early career salary) are used 
to price the product instead of long run gains (mid-career salary). As far as lifetime return 
on an educational investment, mid-career salary probably better represents an 
individual’s return on investment. The reason mid-career salary is probably a better 
representation of return on investment is because most careers are significantly longer 
than the 0-5 years represented by the early career data. The focus on early career salary 
when pricing differential tuition would be good news to those majors who over the course 
of a career close the gap that exists in starting salaries, as they benefit from the lifetime 
earnings but pay a lower differential tuition price, all else equal.  
Limitations 
 As this study is a case study, it will be limited by being a single observation; 
therefore, findings from this analysis cannot be automatically be expected to be true for 
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other research universities. Additionally, peer cost data are dependent on the survey 
information returned to the Delaware Cost Study and PayScale.com and is susceptible to 
any bias included in their survey methodology. 
 The Delaware Cost Study has nearly 200 participants. Although this is a 
substantial number of institutions, it is far from a comprehensive list of all institutions in 
the United States. Because of the incomplete list of institutions, some departments may 
have had difficulties finding peer institutions that they felt matched their specific 
instructional design characteristics. Even though matching CIP codes may have been 
found, the impact of imperfect peers may have resulted in less than optimal peer cost 
estimates. 
 In addition to the incomplete list of institutions, estimations of comparable peers 
are selected without knowledge of such factors as faculty rank distribution at selected 
institutions compared to the case study institution. If a specific department had, for 
example, a disproportionate number of full professors than their group of peers, this 
could result in a less than optimal cost estimate. While these issues exist, we believe their 
impact does not reduce the overall credibility of the analysis, nor do we know of a 
superior methodology available. 
 The state funding survey had a response rate of 47%, which is a limiting factor. In 
addition, the survey data is dependent on the accuracy of respondents’ data. Finally, this 
survey was completed for a peer group of research universities and the results may or 
may not be able to be assumed for other groups of universities. 
Recommendations for Practice 
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 This analysis will be usefully to researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. 
Researchers will be able to use this analysis to provide a baseline for how universities 
price their majors and then in concert with policy makers, can debate if this is how 
institutions “should” be pricing higher education, as well as look at the possible impacts 
to students if this trend continues. Practitioners will be able to use this analysis to see if 
the same drivers explain their pricing structures, or if there are other explanatory 
variables that they think “should” or “are” driving pricing structures. All groups will be 
able to use the equity analysis between departments to look for true inequities in funding 
because of race, class, and gender. In addition, they will be able to have discussions on 
their campus to see if their funding matches up with their mission, or if there are 
inequities that they did not know existed.  
Finally, policy makers, institutional leaders, and researchers can use the state 
funding per resident state supported student FTE to better understand their current level 
of state support and to debate if funding per resident state supported student FTE is an 
equitable way of distributing state resources. Currently, there are a variety of ways that 
states fund higher education, including performance-based models, formula funding 
models, and incremental budgeting models, for example. Funding based on student FTE 
would be more of a voucher type model, aligning students’ choices in schools with the 
state support funding distribution. It would also align the costs of additional students with 
the resources needed to educate them. A model such as this would provide stability of 
funding for universities as well as an increased financial incentive to educate their state’s 
residents. This is in contrast with current structures that may financially incentivize the 
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recruitment of higher tuition non-residents over a state’s own residents, because funding 
is not directly tied to resident student FTE.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
 This study found that cost-based pricing and consumer surplus could explain a 
great deal of an undergraduate program’s differential pricing for the case study 
university. Future research should be done to see if the pricing theories found in this 
paper are found to be significant at other universities. It would also be useful for future 
qualitative research to be done to see if price setters are actually thinking about the 
theories described in this study when they are setting prices, or if the complex political 
and analytical job of setting prices can simply be described by these two theories, but is 
not intentionally done using these theories. 
It is interesting to see that departmental units are equitably funded, even though 
some high cost programs that have low starting incomes have not been charged a 
program fee (essentially meaning that other units are subsidizing these high cost 
programs), further research should be done to consider the amount of this subsidy and 
how it compares to other literature on the disinvestment of certain disciplines. 
Additionally, future research should look at state funding per resident FTE and its 
relationship to undergraduate differential tuition, to see if universities with higher state 
funding per resident FTE charge fewer undergraduate programs differential tuition. These 
findings could either support or contradict our findings that as state subsidies decrease the 
use of differential tuition will increase.  
Finally, it would be interesting to repeat this study for non-state subsidized non-
profit universities. It would be interesting to see if they follow a similar pricing structure 
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as is found here, specifically, if their endowments act as state general funds do in our 
analysis, where if endowments as a percentage of educational costs decrease over time if 
the university increasingly uses differential tuition. A similar analysis could be done to 
see if universities with large endowments are able to charge fewer undergraduate 
differential tuition fees than universities with comparatively smaller endowments. 
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State Appropriations
Variable Description
Variable Sources
IPEDS, Spring 2014, Finance component
Full-time Equivalent
Variable Description
IPEDS Variable Definitions
State appropriations are amounts received by the institution through acts 
of a state legislative body, except grants and contracts and capital 
appropriations. Funds reported in this category are for meeting current 
operating expenses, not for specific projects or programs. 
Full-time equivalent enrollment: This variable is derived from the 
enrollment by race/ethnicity section of the fall enrollment survey. 
The full-time equivalent of the institution's part-time enrollment is 
estimated and then added to the full-time enrollment of the 
institution. This formula has been used to produce the full-time 
equivalent enrollment that is published annually in the Digest of 
Education Statistics. The full-time equivalent of part-time enrollment 
is estimated by multiplying the part-time enrollment by factors that 
vary by control and level of institution and level of student. The 
following factors were used:
Part-time undergraduate enrollment (line 22)
Public 4-year .403543
Not-for-profit and for-profit, 4-year .392857
Public 2-year and <2year .335737
All other sectors .397058
First professional (line 23)
Public 4-year .600000
Not-for-profit and for-profit, 4-year .545454
Graduate (line 25)
Public 4-year .361702
Not-for-profit and for-profit, 4-year .382059
These factors were estimated using reported full-time equivalent of 
part-time enrollments from enrollment data collected in the Higher 
Education General Information System (HEGIS) 1967-1986.
94 
 
 
 
Variable Sources
Derived - IPEDS, Spring 2014, Fall Enrollment component
IPEDs Website: http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/Default.aspx
Description Amount
Fiscal Year 2013 State Appropriations (Source: IPEDS) 60,000,000$         
less State Appropriation not directly related to Core Teaching or University Overhead:
Agricultural Experiment Station 8,000,000                                 
Cooperative Extension Service 9,000,000                                 
Medical School -                                             
Animal Research and Diagnostic Lab -                                             
Enter other State Appropriations not directly related to core teaching and university overhead #1
Enter other State Appropriations not directly related to core teaching and university overhead #2
17,000,000           
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead 43,000,000$         
Description FTE Estimate
Fall 2012 Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment (Source: IPEDS) 11,000                    
less Non-Resident and Non-State Support Students:
All FTE (both Resident and Non-Resident) taking Non-State Supported Courses
All Non-Resident FTE on State Supported Courses 3,000                                         
Medical School Students
Other Non-Resident or Non-State Support Students
Total Non-Resident and Non-State Support Students 3,000                      
Net State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent Estimate 8,000                      
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead 43,000,000$         
Net State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent Estimate 8,000                      
Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident Student FTE 5,375$                    
Example of Completed University
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead
State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent
Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent
Total State Appropriation not directly related to Core Teaching or University Overhead
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Description Amount
Fiscal Year 2013 State Appropriations (Source: IPEDS) 50,000,000$         
less State Appropriation not directly related to Core Teaching or University Overhead:
Agricultural Experiment Station
Cooperative Extension Service
Medical School
Animal Research and Diagnostic Lab
Enter other State Appropriations not directly related to core teaching and university overhead #1
Enter other State Appropriations not directly related to core teaching and university overhead #2
-                          
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead 50,000,000$         
Description FTE Estimate
Fall 2012 Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment (Source: IPEDS) 70,000                    
less Non-Resident and Non-State Support Students:
All FTE (both Resident and Non-Resident) taking Non-State Supported Courses
All Non-Resident FTE on State Supported Courses
Medical School Students
Other Non-Resident and Non-State Support Students
Total Non-Resident and Non-State Support Students -                          
Net State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent Estimate 70,000                    
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead 50,000,000$         
Net State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent Estimate 70,000                    
Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident Student FTE 714$                       
Sample University Fiscal Year 2013 
(please fill out all highlighted cells)
Net State Appropriations for Core Teaching and University Overhead
State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent
Estimated State Appropriations per State Support Resident Student Full-Time Equivalent
Total State Appropriation not directly related to Core Teaching or University Overhead
